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1. Introduction 
This is the fourth report on Angola under the Country Agreement between the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and Chr. 
Michelsen Institute (CMI). In line with the original contract and Terms of 
Reference (Appendix 1), the report consists of a Part I synthesising and 
assessing recent information regarding political, economic and social 
developments in Angola, and a Part II focussing on topics of relevance for 
Norwegian development aid to be specified by NORAD. The topic of focus in 
the first report was Angola’s system of higher education and research capacity 
(Tvedten 2000); the focus in the second report was the role of national and 
international NGOs in development (Tvedten 2001); and the focus in the third 
report was aid in a context of peace (Tvedten et al. 2002). This year’s topic is 
decentralisation – important not only for democracy and political 
participation at the regional and local levels but also for the crucial issue of 
reconciliation after close to 30 years of near continuous war since 
Independence in 1975.  
 
Angola represents an unusual challenge for Norwegian foreign aid and private 
sector development policies. Norwegian interests are considerable, particularly 
in the oil sector, with the Norwegian government’s share of oil revenues likely 
to become higher than the entire aid budget to Africa; the Angolan 
government is generally considered corrupt (Transparency International 2003) 
and has shown limited willingness to contribute to the social development of 
its own people; and the extreme poverty, continued insecurity and limited 
national absorption capacity makes the aid programme particularly difficult to 
implement. Acknowledging this, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has recently gone through an elaborate process of developing a Strategy for 
Norway’s Relationship with Angola for the period 2003-2005, in principle 
covering foreign policy, development aid and private sector development 
(MFA 2003).  
 
Given the importance of Angola, NORAD is also giving increasing emphasis 
to developing its competence on the country. As part of this effort, Mr. 
Rasmus Bakke from NORAD has been involved in the production of this 
report, with responsibility for the section on the Angolan economy. That 
section is therefore given special attention in this year’s report. Growing 
attention is also being devoted to Angola at CMI. The Agreement of 
Cooperation with Angola – Instituto de Pesquisa Social e Económico (AIP) 
involves research around political institutions, the legal system and the oil 
sector as well as institutional capacity building. Mr. Aslak Orre is part of the 
Agreement and has written Part II of this report on decentralisation in 
collaboration with Angolan colleagues (see List of Persons Met). Moreover, 
several CMI consultancies have involved Angola and several students are 
working on masters theses on political developments in the country (see 
Recent Publications on Angola.) Finally, CMI continues to maintain the 
Angola web page (www.cmi.no) which includes i) a presentation of CMI as a 
resource institution on Angola; ii) a list of institutions and individuals working 
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with Angola in Norway; iii) internet links to relevant web pages dealing with 
Angola; and iv) a selected and updated list of literature on the country. 
 
It is a truism that Angola is at a crossroads. The single most important fact is 
that the war is over, and the challenge now is to win the peace. The options 
are often considered to be between a spectacular recovery based on the 
country’s vast and underutilised natural resources – and further cycles of 
instability, crisis and severe poverty. There is also apparent agreement among 
international observers about the need for greater transparency concerning the 
use of the oil income; for investment in a diversified economy and social 
development; and for increased democracy and political pluralism – standing 
in stark contrast to the slow developments on the ground. While we agree that 
there is an urgent need for the government to act in order to utilise the peace 
dividend, there is also a need for some prudence as to what it is possible to 
accomplish in terms of broader development in a short-term perspective – 
given the detrimental state of affairs in most sectors after years of war and 
mismanagement.  
 
Having said this, we will maintain that two issues – about which the Angolan 
government can do something on a short-term basis – should be important test 
cases and benchmarks for Norway’s future relations with Angola: one is the 
issue of transparency, particularly in the oil sector; and the second is the issue 
of higher allocations to the social sectors of health and education. Without 
positive developments in these areas, the discrepancy between the policies of 
the Angolan government and important principles in Norway’s foreign and 
aid policy simply seems too big. Unfortunately, the strategy developed by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains no clear assessments of how 
to relate to alternative scenarios of this nature. 
 
Let me finally reiterate the purpose of the annual CMI Angola reports: they 
are to serve as a basis for discussions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation as well as in other 
Norwegian private and public institutions involved in Angola – for whom it is 
made available through the CMI Report Series. As such they are meant to be 
“provocative” and stir debate – and hence do not represent the official views 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD. 
 
 
Bergen October 2003 
 
Inge Tvedten 
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2. Political Developments 
Let us start the discussion about recent political developments in Angola by 
briefly recapturing the main events since the death of Jonas Savimbi in 
February 2002 and the signing of the so-called Luena Accords between the 
MPLA government and UNITA in April that year. 
 
The Accords were formally an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 that 
is still  the accepted and legitimate framework for peace in Angola. The 
Accords provide for an amnesty for all crimes committed within the context of 
the armed conflict; the demobilisation of UNITA soldiers; the integration of 
UNITA officers into the Angolan army (FAA); and vocational reintegration of 
demobilised personnel into national life. In an important symbolic move, 
UNITA has publicly apologised to the people of Angola for its role in the war.  
 
At the same time UNITA initiated the process of transforming itself into a 
political party, while formally dismantling its army. UNITA’s interim leader 
Paulo Lukamba “Gato” moved to Luanda to head a management commission, 
met with president Eduardo dos Santos, and worked to reconcile the 
organisation’s armed wing that had fought in the “bush”, people who had  
been based in Luanda and had taken up seats in Parliament, and UNITA 
members in exile. The process culminated in a joint Congress in July 2003, 
electing UNITA’s former representative in Paris Esaia Samukuva as its new 
president – apparently as a result of  Mr. Lukumba being considered too close 
to old lines of rivalry.1 
 
Mr. Samakuva, who is 56 years old, is respected in Angola and abroad (EIU 
2003). Like most of the UNITA leadership he is from the Ovimbundu ethnic 
group of the central highlands, and the son of a pastor. He has spent much 
time abroad, acting as UNITA’s treasurer in London and for the past four 
years as its unofficial representative in Paris. Having lived outside Angola he 
has been able to distance himself from the party’s divisions, which followed 
when Savimbi took the country back to war in 1992.  
 
The overall political structure and power relations within the ruling MPLA 
and government have remained largely intact, with work on a new 
constitution initiated in 1998 still not having been completed. Among the 
significant outstanding issues is how power will be distributed between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches at the national and provincial levels 
(see Part II of this report). The de facto power continues to rest with President 
Eduardo dos Santos and a small political and military elite in Futungo. The 
reinstatement of the post of Prime Minster as head of government in 
December 2002 did not significantly alter this. The new Prime Minister, Mr. 
Fernando da Piedade dos Santos (“Nando”), is a political heavyweight and 
                                                 
1 In fact, the elections set a new democratic standard in Angolan party politics by using a 
secret ballot in electing the president. Esaia Samakuva won decisively with 1067 votes out of 
1364, against 277 for Mr. Lukamba and 20 for the third candidate Mr. Dinho Chingunji. 
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has improved government efficiency and delivery priority, but he is close to 
Eduardo dos Santos. Likewise, the Parliament still finds itself largely sidelined, 
with members of the opposition parties recently being particularly dissatisfied 
with the way the national budget was rushed through Parliament in the spring 
of 2003.  
 
The main strategy for securing power is a widespread system of patronage, 
costing the Presidency millions of dollars. The majority of Parliamentarians 
(including members of the official opposition) are de facto dependent on the 
Presidency for their livelihoods and privileges; regional governors with their 
considerable power-base depend on the Presidency for their appointments; and 
relations of patronage are the main reason why the military does not represent 
an independent political power base as it does in many other sub-Saharan 
countries. Nevertheless, there are people within central political circles who 
want to change the political system by making it adhere more closely to 
constitutional principles and become more transparent – among them Lopo do 
Nascimento, who is currently considered one of the most likely Presidential 
candidates should dos Santos step down.2 
 
The immediate political issues following the peace between MPLA and 
UNITA are generally considered to have been handled well, with Angolan 
political leaders arguing that the non-involvement of the international 
community is a main reason for the contrast to similar transitions in 1990-
1992 and after the Lusaka Agreement in 1994.3 However, there is equally 
strong agreement that the humanitarian situation in and around the UNITA 
quartering areas remains serious and represents a severe threat to political 
stability. The Government announced early on a commitment of USD 125 
million for a two-year integration plan, but payments have been “irregular 
and not universal”. More than 85,000 UNITA ex-combatants and 220,000 
dependants only received a fraction of the support they were promised in the 
form of money, food, seeds and tools, with most now having left the camps to 
an uncertain future in their original home areas. In fact the government 
officially closed the camps in June 2003, which led to a strong international 
reaction. The UNITA ex-combatants add to the already existing 4 million 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs), who are also believed to be attempting to 
return to their home areas with little or no assistance from the government 
and with the United Nations taking on an increasing responsibility. 
 
Elections are widely considered to be the test case for reform of the political 
system, not only for the presidency and Parliament but also for regional and 
local government. President dos Santos earlier stated that elections would be 
held in 2004, and that he would not stand for a second term (with the first 
                                                 
2 The only official candidates so far are the leader of the Liberal Party Anáila de Vitoria 
Pereira; Vicente Pinto de Andrade, who is still an MPLA member; and the independent Carlos 
Contreiras. 
3 In August 2002, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1433 authorising the 
establishment of a new United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA), with the former Under 
Secretary for African Affairs Ibrahim Gambari named interim head. While of important 
symbolic value, the presence of the United Nations as a peacekeeping force continued to be 
marginal and the term ended in early February 2003. 
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term having lasted since elections in 1992). Currently, two alternative 
scenarios seem most relevant. One is that he will not stand but postpone 
elections until 2006 or later, in order to see the transition to peace through 
and salvage his own reputation from one of a corrupt leader to one who made 
the peace and set the country on the road to recovery. A second is that he will 
stand for a new term, but only when he thinks that the conditions are right 
and people see MPLA as a political party and not a “war machine”. There has 
also been speculation that he may try to shift power from the presidency and 
back to the MPLA party, having the party leadership as a platform from 
which he can continue to control Angolan politics. The fifth party conference 
in the history of the MPLA will be held in December 2003. 
 
In addition, UNITA will need some time to consolidate itself as a party, and 
Mr. Samukuva has recently indicated 2005 to be the most relevant date for 
elections. While his position appears strong, Paulo Lukumba “Gato” and his 
influential former secretaries for information and political affairs are currently 
out of the party leadership and their longer-term political ambitions are 
uncertain. The deeper divisions in the party will affect the degree to which 
UNITA cooperates with or challenges the government on major policy issues. 
However, the biggest risk to the development of UNITA as an independent 
political force seems to be that its leaders may be co-opted or “bought off” by 
MPLA power-holders in the same way that the political fractions of UNITA 
remaining in Luanda were. The financial situation of UNITA itself is unclear, 
with speculation that vast resources based on their control of diamond areas 
during the war were siphoned off by parts of the leadership during its final 
stages.  
 
Both MPLA and UNITA – with their respective legacies as “murderers” and 
“thieves” (summed up in the 1992 election graffiti posters “MPLA roba e 
UNITA mata”) – will have a common interest in inhibiting third parties or 
presidential candidates from growing in importance. At present no obvious 
“third force” is visible, despite attempts from the opposition to form a united 
front through the joint Angola Civil Opposition Parties (POC). The Catholic 
and Ecumenical churches have worked hard for peace and still represent 
important critical voices, but are unlikely to turn themselves into political 
parties. Other parts of civil society, such as the respected NGO Accão para o 
Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA) and the vocal Mão Livres, will 
remain important critics of the political establishment but do not have 
political ambitions per se. 
 
An equally important test case for democracy is the policy towards regional 
and local elections. Proper regional and local elections are important not only 
for democracy and political participation, but also for the critical issue of 
reconciliation. Important lessons should be learnt from the ways Namibia, 
South Africa and Mozambique, for example, have handled this issue – ranging 
from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission via Mozambique’s 
low-key and localised initiatives to the Namibian government’s attempts to 
put a lid on any debate related to past atrocities. 
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The MPLA government has maintained strong control over the provinces by 
appointing powerful provincial governors – many of whom have managed to 
become exceedingly unpopular – and they themselves have appointed “their” 
representatives at the municipal and comuna levels (see Chapter 6). For 
UNITA, proper regional and local elections have been seen as a way to get 
closer to their ambition of a federal type of government, under the assumption 
that they will hold their traditional and heavily populated strongholds on the 
planalto and in particular the provinces of Huambo, Bié, Huila and Kwanza 
Sul. It currently looks as though the government is winning the power struggle 
by maintaining the system of appointing regional governors, who are selected 
from the party with the majority in the province but still under firm control. 
The new constitution may open the way for elections at the municipal and 
comuna level, but this will represent a much smaller threat to central 
government, which will still control the allocation of resources. 
 
In fact, the most visible “sign of change” may be said to be discussions 
between MPLA and UNITA about a new Angolan flag, indicating a 
willingness to reconcile and forget past history, but in itself hardly more.  
 
Figure 1: Proposed New Angolan Flag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The apparent stabilisation of the political status quo and the slow pace of 
change are in defiance of strong international pressure for substantial 
alterations in the Angolan political system. The pressure has been particularly 
strong from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for transparency around 
the government’s oil income, with annual diversion of an estimated USD 1 
billion in oil revenues or 32 percent of the estimated total income from 
Angola’s oil production. The IMF discontinued its Staff Monitored 
Programme (SMP) in June 2001 and a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) has still not been completed – the latter being a key IMF requirement 
for any country undertaking structural adjustment (see Chapter 3). The 
implications of non-compliance are apparently severe for the Angolan 
government: without a green light from the IMF Angola will not be eligible for 
debt rescheduling; donors are reluctant to increase their involvement and 
support a donors’ round table conference; and its non-compliance may have 
serious repercussions for Angola’s ambition to be a key player on the 
international as well as the Southern African regional scene.  
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At the present time, then, the government is largely seen to be jeopardising its 
international credibility; risking continued instability, particularly in former 
UNITA-held areas; and losing the options and momentum for social and 
economic development inherent in the peace dividend. Why? 
 
The most common explanation seems to be that the political power-holders 
simply have too much to lose by becoming more transparent and 
decentralising power. Too much money from oil and diamonds has ended up 
in their own pockets: Transparency International ranked Angola tied for third 
from the bottom in its 2002 “Corruption Perceptions Index”; 600 million 
USD of Angolan funds have recently been frozen in Swiss bank accounts; and 
the local newspaper ANGOLENSE recently published a list of 59 politicians, 
generals and business-men with fortunes of more than USD 50 million. The 
system of clientelism makes it difficult for those who would like to break out 
of the corrupt relationships to do so. Furthermore, the political elite gathered 
in Luanda seems to have detached itself so much from the population that 
their suffering has become invisible to them. It is in a sense a system “beyond 
salvation” where the central actors have to fight for its retention using all 
possible and impossible means – or perish with its dismantling. 
 
A second explanation is a determination among Angolan power-holders not to 
yield to international pressure and to follow their own path, resisting what 
they see as a continuing effort by foreigners to limit Angolan sovereignty. 
They will point to Angolan history – from colonialism and slavery, via the 
Cold War and to the post-colonial pressure for democracy and economic 
liberalisation – as a continuous history of interference in Angolan affairs. They 
will also point to the rapid and successful transition to peace and 
reconciliation between the MPLA government and UNITA as proof that 
Angolans are capable of taking care of their own affairs. The pride (some 
neighbouring countries and Lusophone brothers would rather call it 
“arrogance”) in being Angolans and a nation with large wealth and potential 
power is found not only among the political elite, but also deep in Angolan 
society. 
 
The third explanation is that political change and the reallocation of state 
resources from war to peace and development simply takes time. The 
institutional framework is too weak; there is a lack of organisational and 
logistical capacity; and with the legacy of war the state is still not sufficiently 
coherent. The government cannot allocate economic resources to provinces, 
municipalities and economic sectors as long as there is such a limited capacity 
to receive and use them constructively. They will also argue that some 
progress has been made in laying the foundation for transparency and 
reallocation of state funds, for example, through the “diagnosis” of the oil 
sector carried out by the international accountancy firm KPMG; and that 
transparency is a two-way-street also requiring greater transparency from the 
major investors, particularly in the oil sector. 
 
The real reason for the unfolding of events is probably a combination of these 
factors, with the latter two being the basis for our introductory words of 
caution about the possible speed of change. Most international observers 
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(including the influential “International Crisis Group”) argue vehemently that 
it is in the Angolan government’s own interest to move down the political and 
economic reform path: upcoming elections require the ruling MPLA to seek 
electoral support, and the most direct way is to improve the state’s capacity to 
deliver goods and services. The government’s desire to enhance its 
international image and project itself onto the continental and world stages 
also entails a reform logic, as does President dos Santos’ wish to enhance his 
legacy. Political and economic reform – combined with a commitment to 
address social ills and inequities – would ensure more broad-based economic 
growth, allow a genuine private sector to develop, free up hundreds of 
millions of dollars for social investment through a more transparent budget 
process, transform the political system into a more pluralistic one that 
promotes human rights, and lay the groundwork for long-term stability. 
 
The main immediate test case of the will and commitment of the Angolan 
government for change remains a greater transparency around its vast income 
from oil. This is important for three main reasons: it is a key to ensuring that 
resources are spent on the main priorities for poverty reduction, such as the 
social sectors (education and health) and infrastructure (transport, power, 
water); it is crucial for a constructive dialogue with donors and creditors; and 
it lies at the heart of improving governance. However, greater transparency 
and openness involve key economic interests both outside and within Angola, 
and there are signs that the Angolan government is embarking on an 
alternative strategy of “bilateralism” rather than “multilateralism”, which 
may reduce the pressure for change. Bilateral relations with “friendly” allies 
and countries sharing important economic interests – such as Portugal, Brazil, 
South Africa and the United States – may serve the government’s interests best, 
at least in a short-term perspective.  
 
For long-term political stability, however, this is not likely to be sustainable 
and an increasing number of observers see the main pressure as coming from 
inside Angola. Possible political upheaval may follow a continued failure to 
diversify the economy and generate jobs and income; growing social inequality 
may lead to resentment and conflict; there are ethnic and regional imbalances 
and inadequate avenues for popular participation – all in a population that is 
increasingly aware of the vast resources their government actually controls 
and the potential they represent for improving their lives. Angolans have a 
long history of protest and armed conflict and, particularly in the 
overcrowded urban centres in the country and in the self-aware and heavily 
populated central highlands, things may get out of hand and make Angola 
unstable and impossible to govern.  
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3. The Angolan Economy 
3.1 Economic Performance and Outlook 
The widespread poverty in Angola (to be treated in more detail in Chapter 4) 
contrasts sharply with the huge incomes from the oil sector. Angola's economy 
is driven by the production of oil, and international oil prices. Real GDP 
growth has been relatively robust since 1999. Oil production boomed in 2001 
and reached a level of 900,000 barrels per day in 2002 – pushing the overall 
growth rate in the economy for 2002 to 15.3%. 
 
The growth rate for 2003 is forecasted to decline to 4.4%, largely on account 
of a lower growth rate in the oil sector. The medium-term economic outlook is 
dominated by an anticipated large increase in oil production. Over the next 
five years, oil production is expected to more than double, and to exceed 2 
million barrels per day by 2008. The IMF projected annual real GDP growth 
rate for the period 2003-08 is 11.6%. The peace process and the expected 
high levels of oil production for the coming years imply that Angola now has 
the best opportunity in years to rebuild its economy after a quarter century of 
war and mismanagement.   
 
Annual inflation was 268% in year 2000, 116% in 2001 and 106% in 2002. 
The primary cause of this poor performance is lack of fiscal and monetary 
discipline. Monetisation of government deficits – and subsidised credit to 
favoured groups – generated rapid growth in money supply and inflation. In 
the past, power-holders such as Sonangol have benefited from high inflation, 
by delaying payments in domestic currency for oil and other sales received in 
hard currency (EIU 2003). The prognosis for 2003, shared by the Angolan 
government and IMF, is 65%. In the light of figures from mid 2003 there is 
reason to ask whether this is realistic. The government hopes to achieve a 
reduction by slowing down the growth rate of borrowed money. 
 
Table 1: Key Economic Indicators 
ECONOMIC 
INDICATOR 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
(estimate) 
2003 
(prog) 
Gross Domestic Product 
(USD bn) 
6.1 8.9 9.5 11.2 12.6 
Real GDP growth (%) 3.3 3.0 3.2 15.3 4.4 
Oil sector growth (%) 1.0 0.4 -1.0 22.1 4.3 
Oil production (1000 b/d) 746 748 740 903 942 
Consumer price index (%) 329 268 116 106 65 
Source: IMF  
 
The capital-intensive oil sector has few linkages to other sectors of the 
economy. The sector produced 55.5% of GDP in 2002, and has boomed as 
the rest of the economy has been devastated by war, macro-economic 
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instability and poor policy choices. Output has risen steadily over the last 
decade, but has remained quite stable for the period 1999-2001. A string of 
large deepwater discoveries has been made since 1996, and production from 
these began to come on stream in 2001 (EIU 2003).  
 
The 100% state-owned national company Sonangol is the sole concessionaire. 
Foreign operators are allowed to participate in production, but are required to 
form joint ventures with the company. Sonangol’s growing power and vast 
commercial activities in areas outside the oil sector are a source of concern to 
investors. Sonangol has unique access to capital, as well as political influence. 
These factors – together with the company’s ongoing expansion into non-core 
areas – are distorting the Angolan economy. The role Sonangol plays in 
Angola and the fact that its accounts are not audited is of particular concern.  
 
Angola is one of the world’s largest diamond producers. The diamond 
industry is split between the formal and the informal sector, with the latter 
being exploited by small-scale diggers (garimpeiros).  UNITA largely funded 
the war with smuggled diamonds. UN diamond sanctions were applied against 
UNITA in 1998, and incomes decreased until the end of the war in 2002. 
Diamonds produced approximately 6% of GDP for the period 2000-02.  
 
Agriculture accounted for 7.8% of GDP in 2002, as compared with 18% in 
1990. Angola has a climate conducive to agriculture, but conditions have 
deteriorated as a result of war and poor policies. Traditional crops include 
cassava, beans, maize, millet and sorghum. Maize is the main cereal crop, and 
production was estimated at 460,000 tonnes in 2001, compared with a total 
food requirement of 1.38 million tonnes (EIU 2003).  
 
Table 2: Sectors of Activity, Percent of GDP 
SECTOR 2000 2001 2002 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 5.8 8.0 7.8 
Oil and LPG 60.6 53.6 55.5 
Diamonds 6.4 5.8 5.5 
Manfacturing 2.9 3.8 3.7 
Construction 2.8 3.5 3.4 
Trade and Commerce 14.5 15.6 15.3 
Others 7.0 9.7 8.8 
Total 100 100 100 
Source : IMF  
 
 
Production of coffee and other cash crops, including sisal, cotton, palm oil and 
tobacco, has dropped dramatically. There is still some sugar production in the 
Southern Coastal areas. Livestock rearing is concentrated in the South-West of 
the country. Angola is rich in fishing resources, although certain species (such 
as carapau or horse-mackerel) are seriously over-exploited. The ending of war 
should bring rapid improvements for agriculture, reopening the crucial trade 
links between the rural and urban areas.  
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Angola has a small manufacturing sector, which produces consumer goods 
and building materials and undertakes metal work and assembly for the oil 
sector. There are also breweries and bottling plants, an oil refinery, sawmills 
and a number of small factories. Manufacturing accounted for 3.7% of GDP 
in 2002. The sector operates far below its potential, owing to the extremely 
adverse domestic operating environment characterised by high costs, 
corruption, poor quality of local services and weak enforcement of property 
rights and the rule of law (EIU 2003). Finally, construction accounted for 
approximately 3.4% of GDP in 2002 according to official data. The sector is 
expected to benefit from post-war reconstruction in Angola.  
3.2 The External Sector 
Angola has consistently run a large trade surplus owing to its oil exports. 
However, official data do not capture trade flows that escape official controls 
– implying that there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the real trade 
balance. Oil exports were worth an estimated USD 7.7 billion in 2002, 
accounting for 91.8% of total export earnings. Diamonds accounted for most 
of the rest with 7.6% of total exports. 
 
Despite large trade surpluses, Angola's current account has mostly been in 
deficit since 1988 – averaging just under USD 1.2 billion per year for the 
period 1995-99 according to IMF estimates. An exception was a surplus at 
USD 800 million in 2000, due to exceptionally high oil prices. The deficit for 
2002 is estimated at approximately USD 600 million. Deficits are primarily 
caused by large invisible deficits, mainly interest obligations on external debt, 
the remittance of profits and dividends by oil companies, payments for 
transport and shipping, budgets for official travel, contracts with foreign 
construction companies, and significant outflows of money through 
“unorthodox” means (EIU 2003). 
 
Table 3: External Sector 
 2000 2001 2002 (est) 2003 
(prog) 
Export (billions of US$) 7,9 6,5 8,4 8,7 
Oil Sector 7,1 5,8 7,7 8,0 
Diamonds 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,7 
Imports 3,0 3,2 3,7 4,3 
Trade Balance 4,9 3,4 4,6 4,4 
Current Account 
Balance 
0,8 -1,4 -0,6 -1,0 
Total External Debt 10,2 9,6 9,3 9,9 
Debt Service Ratio 
(percent of export) 
36,3 41,2 26,4 24,6 
Source: IMF  
 
Angolan total foreign debt stock stood at USD 9.6 billion in 2001. Roughly 
80% of the debt was publicly guaranteed long-term debt. However, there is a 
lack of clarity over the country's true debt position owing to a large number of 
complicated and opaque debt operations involving the collateralisation of oil 
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sales. These were initially spurred by a huge demand for military hardware 
after the return to war in 1992. Servicing these debt operations currently 
accounts for a major part of the Government's own oil revenue. For 2001, 
over 90% of the national oil production from Sonangol was earmarked for 
paying off such loans and the rest was almost entirely used for capitalising 
Sonangol's oilfield developments. This left little to the Treasury, apart from oil 
company tax and royalty payments (EIU 2003).  
 
Angola signalled to the IMF in 2000 that it would limit the use of new oil-
backed finance to roughly US$ 269 million annually. Given that these loans 
are costly, the Government was urged to seek eligibility for the concessional 
finance available to less developed countries. However, the Government 
continued the practice of taking up large oil-backed borrowings, and insisted 
that they were refinancing earlier loans and not breaching the benchmarks 
agreed with the IMF. 
 
Foreign reserves have traditionally been low in Angola, with an average of 
US$ 601 million from 1998 to 2002, or less than 2.7 months of import cover 
(EIU 2003). Most recent data from May 2003 were USD 417 million, or the 
equivalent of 1.3 months of import cover. 
 
Angola has a history of high or hyperinflation, and the exchange rate has been 
similarly unstable. The Government also followed a fixed exchange rate 
regime for a long period, with the result that an enormous gap emerged 
between official and parallel rates and created serious distortions in pricing 
signals and the allocation of resources.  
 
The Government abolished dual exchange rates in May 1999 – and in 
December a "new" Kwanza (Kz) replaced the "old" readjusted Kwanza (Kzr) 
at a rate of Kzr1m:Kz1. The new currency has broadly depreciated in line with 
the parallel market rate, to which it has generally traded at a differential of 
roughly 5% (EIU 2003). During the first half of 2003 the kwanza has 
continued to depreciate, but at less than the rate of inflation. In an operation 
to counter depreciation, the Treasury engaged in a massive buying of kwanza 
in September 2003. The wider effects of this new strategy are yet to be seen. 
3.3 The Fiscal Situation 
Angola's main source of fiscal revenue is taxation of the oil sector. As a result, 
the fiscal revenues have been excessively vulnerable to international crude oil 
price volatility. Revenue has not always been able to keep pace with 
expenditure. Grants and debt relief have historically played a very small role 
in financing Angola's deficit on a cash basis. The Government alternated 
between net external borrowing and domestic financing throughout the 
second half of the 1990s, reflecting the country's ability to borrow in 
international capital markets. As new oilfield discoveries were made – with the 
following massive inflow of resources – the maintenance of a large fiscal 
imbalance was facilitated.  
 
The ratio of the overall fiscal deficit to GDP more than doubled in 2002. This 
reflects a decline in the share of oil tax receipts in GDP, and a lack of public 
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expenditure management and controls. Most of the fiscal deficit was financed 
by further accumulation of payment arrears – an expansion of Central Bank 
credit, further costly borrowing from international commercial banks, and the 
depletion of foreign exchange balances held in Angola's offshore account.  
 
Table 4: Governmental Expenditures and Revenues (USD Millions) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
(prel) 
Total Expenditure  2,771 5,016 5,387 4,383 5,370 
Education 167 92 169 295 320 
Health 89 73 179 249 213 
Total Revenue 2,034 2,852 4,586 4,029 4,367 
Oil revenue 1,506 2,504 4,098 3,209 3,349 
Overall balance  -737 -2164 -801 -354 -1,003 
Source: IMF  
 
A Public Expenditure Review (PER) conducted in Angola between 1991 and 
1993 noted that the current profile of public expenditure in Angola was 
incompatible with a market-friendly growth strategy. First, the level of public 
expenditure was very high as a share of GDP; and second, its composition was 
strongly biased towards activities with little direct contribution to 
development – given that three-quarters of public expenditure was devoted to 
general administration and defence.  
 
These trends continued in the second half of the 1990s. The share of 
Government expenditure in GDP remained high during the period 1995-2001, 
being consistently above 40% and reaching 61% in 2000, reflecting the 
scaling-up of the Government's war effort against UNITA. Nor does the 
evolution of expenditure composition by function during the latter half of the 
1990s indicate significant improvement since the 1993 PER was conducted. 
Throughout the period high shares for defence and public order expenditures 
co-existed with very low shares for education, health and other social sectors.  
 
Table 5: Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures, Percent 
EXPENDITURE 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
General Public services and other 
economic affairs 
17,8 3,7 7,2 27,8 33,2 
Defence and internal security 33,7 31,3 14,7 15,5 15,0 
Education 6,0 1,8 3,1 6,7 6,0 
Health 3,2 1,5 3,3 5,7 4,0 
Social security, welfare and housing 2,2 1,5 9,.0 7,1 5,7 
Others 37,1 60,2 62,7 37,2 36,1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: IMF  
 
 
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the actual figures for the 
functional distribution of government expenditure. However, with regard to 
health and education, there is an increase in expenditure for 2001 and 2002 
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compared with the low number from 1999 and 2000. The level for the social 
sectors is still very low compared with similar expenditures in other Sub- 
Saharan countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia.  
 
For the 2003 budget the social sectors are stable at 16% of total expenditure, 
with education allocated 6.2% and health 5.8%. There is no clear trend of 
increased priority to the social sectors, which is a central test regarding the 
desire of the Government for a poverty reducing policy.  
 
In the education sector structural problems and lack of capacity in the 
Ministry also inhibit increased investment. However, the establishment of 
29,000 new positions for teachers in primary education in 2003 may indicate 
a stronger government will to give higher priority to these sectors.   
3.4 Economic Policy and Relations to IMF 
In April 2000 a nine-month staff monitoring programme (SMP) was signed 
with the IMF. The programme was extended to June 2001. It included 
agreements about a partial audit of financial flows from the oil sector; an 
audit of the Central Bank; a commitment to end off-budget expenditures and 
unauthorised payments; and cost recovery measures for public utilities. The 
programme also focused on achieving greater fiscal and financial 
transparency, increasing private sector participation in state enterprises, and 
increasing spending on health and education.  
 
While some of the SPM targets were met, structural reform was weak and 
macroeconomic stabilisation was not achieved. This was related to a lack of 
monetary control and to huge fiscal deficits. Public spending on health and 
education were not substantially increased, either in absolute terms or as a 
percentage of government spending. Public financial management was weak, 
with poor expenditure tracking and budget execution. The main cause of 
failure was that revenue was unaccounted for, resulting in a large discrepancy 
between actual and declared revenue fees. Another main concern was the 
government’s foreign debt operations. Billions of dollars were collateralised 
against future oil production with Western banks and the Government has 
refused to bring these funds into official channels.  
 
The SMP formally expired in June 2001, followed by a prolonged period of 
informal monitoring – officially to allow the Government more time to meet 
outstanding commitments, but in reality the Government drew out the process 
as much as possible to buy time.  
 
In mid-2002 the Government indicated that it wanted a “gradualist approach” 
to reform, and that it did not want another IMF programme. However, it 
soon ran into problems in trying to raise support among donors for a 
conference to back post-war reconstruction. Most Western donors and foreign 
aid agencies remain highly reluctant to offer such assistance until an 
appropriate macroeconomic framework was in place. 
 
During the Article IV consultations with the IMF in March 2003 the Angolan 
Government indicated that it wanted to resume negotiations and requested a 
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new programme. As for the 2000 SMP, transparency in oil revenue 
management, budget execution and central bank operations were central 
themes in the discussions. 
 
The IMF has highlighted the need to ensure transparency in the management 
of oil operations, and to establish fiscal control over payments from Sonangol 
and the international oil companies operating in Angola. According to the 
IMF, regular auditing of Sonangol’s operations is needed both to reduce the 
risk of corruption and mismanagement and to provide a basis for sound 
macroeconomic management. To this end Sonangol should be required to 
adopt international accounting standards (IAS). The IMF also recommends 
publication of the inception and final report from the Oil Diagnostic Study.  
 
The Angolan Government (GoA) has agreed to the need to increase 
transparency in fiscal revenue management. Ongoing initiatives to improve the 
management of oil revenues include the annual external auditing of tax 
declarations submitted by Sonangol and international oil companies to the 
Treasury and the use of international audit firms to conduct limited reviews of 
the financial accounts of Sonangol P&P and Sonangol EP Holding. The GoA 
also declared its intention to publish the Executive Summary of the oil 
diagnostic study, and to set a firm schedule for the remaining work on the 
study.  
 
Other steps proposed by the GoA to increase transparency and accountability 
are that Ministry of Finance intends to begin publishing upstream financial 
flow data in dollars on a regular basis on its web-site, and that Sonangol will 
work towards a consolidated accounting system for all its upstream 
operations. The GoA also claims it will take steps to ensure the transparent 
and up-to-date recording of Sonangol’s quasi-fiscal operations. Sonangol’s 
action plan for accounting and auditing indicates that the external auditing of 
the consolidated accounts could take place in first quarter of 2004. 
 
The ongoing diagnostic work on the oil sector is meant to include an Inception 
Report, a Final Report and several quarterly reports on the results of an oil 
revenue projection model. The inception and final reports will contain an 
assessment of physical oil reserves, production, exports, exploration costs, an 
overview of the legal, regulatory and fiscal frameworks for the oil sector, an 
analysis of the disposition of the inflows of oil revenues, an evaluation of the 
disposition of oil revenue outflows (including Sonangol's cash call payments 
and oil-based debt servicing) and a brief assessment of the accounts of 
Sonangol and the Central Bank. The Final Report will also contain specific 
recommendations for reform. 
 
Having said all this, the published summary shows substantial weaknesses in 
the accounting systems in Sonangol and BNA. The use of both local currency 
and US dollars in the account leads to great difficulties in the reconciliation of 
the accounts – given hyper-inflation, the current depreciation of the Kwanza, 
and the lengthy time lag between in - and outflows. There are also open 
weaknesses in the systems of financial management, and a lack of data, 
documentation and control mechanisms. The division of roles between 
C M I 
 16 
MINFIN, BNA and Sonangol regarding the administration of incomes is still 
unclear. Nor has the existing legislation regarding the channelling of incomes 
been handled properly. 
 
Nevertheless, publishing the summary of the oil diagnostic study and other 
steps taken by the Government are positive signals, although it still remains to 
be seen how far the Government is willing to go in this work. Experience from 
earlier dialogues and attempts at reform indicate that the strength and 
influence of counter-reform forces with interests in the status quo are 
substantial. 
 
Some important steps in the right direction regarding general budget execution 
have also been taken in relation to the 2003 revised budget. This revision 
includes not only the quasi-fiscal operations of Sonangol, but also other 
government expenditures that have previously been executed outside the 
budget, notably payments for wages, pensions, and goods and services for the 
military.  
 
There is also ongoing work in public financial management related to the 
Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review 
(PEMFAR). The main objective of PEMFAR is to provide a comprehensive 
and integrated assessment of Angola's fiduciary framework. PEMFAR intends 
as a first step to concentrate on identifying institutional weaknesses present in 
Angola's public finance framework that give rise to fiscal problems, such as 
the consistent pattern of large unexplained discrepancies in the fiscal accounts. 
As a second step the focus will be shifted to the composition of public 
expenditures, in which the government's strategic choices in terms of resource 
allocations will be evaluated.  
 
The audit for the balance sheet accounts of the BNA for 1999 and 2000 has 
been finalised. The three main areas of concern are: i) an overriding lack of 
internal controls; ii) an incomplete/inadequate accounting of foreign assets and 
liabilities; and iii) an incomplete/ inadequate accounting of net credit to 
government. 
 
The authorities have made adjustments to the BNA’s December 2002 balance 
sheet. BNA and the Ministry of Finance signed a protocol on the management 
of monetary policy in September 2002. The IMF’s assessment is that the 
Protocol, if properly implemented, will make the BNA’s balance sheet an 
adequate tool for measuring and monitoring the country’s international 
reserves and the stock and flow of central bank credit to government.    
 
These adjustments are steps in the right direction, but again it remains to be 
seen whether they will be followed up by the Government.  
3.5 The PRSP Process 
It has been decided that nationally-owned participatory poverty reduction 
strategies shall provide the basis for all World Bank and IMF concessional 
lending. This approach is reflected in the development of Poverty Reduction 
C M I 
 17 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by national authorities. In Africa thirteen countries – 
among them Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia – have completed PRSPs. 
 
There are five core principles underlying the development and implementation 
of poverty reduction strategies. The strategies should be: i) country driven; ii) 
result-oriented; iii) comprehensive in recognising the multidimensional nature 
of poverty; iv) partnership-oriented; and v) based on a long-term perspective 
for poverty reduction 
 
A first draft of a PRSP document for Angola was presented by the 
Government in November 2001. There have been few attempts to develop 
national ownership of the PRSP process within the Ministry of Planning 
(MINPLAN) and even fewer in the sector ministries. The first version of the 
PRSP was therefore criticised by both the donors and Angolan civil society. 
Since then, work on the PRSP has not been given priority by the Government. 
Planning and implementation related to humanitarian operations, 
demobilisation and resettlement of internal refugees have been prioritised. The 
GoA wants to hold a donor conference in relation to the following up of the 
peace process, but there has been a broad agreement in the donor community 
that an Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) must be the basis for such a meeting.    
 
An I-PRSP is meant to outline a country's existing poverty reduction strategy 
and to provide a road-map for the development of a full PRSP. A draft interim 
PRSP was finalised by the Government in May 2002 and presented to the 
donors in July the same year. The actions to be taken for poverty alleviation 
were along five broad themes: 
 
o Undertaking economic and institutional reform (particularly in public 
finance and administration) to promote macroeconomic stability and 
economic growth. 
o Expanding the human capital base by strengthening and restructuring 
professional training as well as the delivery of health and education 
services. 
o Rehabilitating social and economic infrastructure, concentrating on 
water supply, housing, electricity, transportation and communication. 
o Promoting pro-poor growth through rural development, artisanal 
fishing, and small and micro-enterprises, with a focus on private sector 
development. 
o Strengthening public sector capacity and institutions – also at the 
provincial and local levels – through restructuring and deconcentration. 
 
The draft document also contains elements of a programme of consultation 
with civil society, a summary of interventions at a sectoral level, and a 
preliminary monitoring and evaluation strategy.  
 
Reactions among the main donors to this document were that it contained 
little new and did not serve as a sufficient basis for the planned donor 
conference. Firstly, the plan did not include an analysis or strategic decision 
for reducing poverty. Secondly, there was no budget or financial plan for the 
next three years. Thirdly, there were no signals of possible changes on 
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allocations of resources between the different sectors. Fourthly, suggested 
activities were not targeted on specific groups, geographical areas or sectors 
based on an analysis of the distribution of poverty. And fifthly, the macro-
economic analysis seemed to assume that the  reduction of poverty would 
occur automatically given the absence of war and as a result of economic 
growth, without reference to the issue of distribution.  
 
The most positive aspect of the plan was seen as the introduction of a 
consultation process with civil society. Since the draft was published there has 
been consultation in the provinces and Ministries, and input has also been 
given by NGOs.  
 
An outline for a full Interim PRSP was presented to the donors in August 
2003. The full document will be handed over to the donors and civil society 
after the document has been approved by the Councils of Ministers. This 
outline includes a macro-economic framework, objectives, goals, outputs and 
identification of areas of intervention. There are also plans for consultation 
with central, provincial and local governments, the Parliament, NGOs and 
civil society, the private sector, representatives of local communities and the 
international community. Instruments and indicators for monitoring and 
evaluation are also included in the outline. 
 
The document also contains the required three-year macroeconomic 
framework. For the year 2003, the macro-framework is already incorporated 
in the budget. A macro-economic framework has also been developed for the 
planned 2004 budget and will be included for 2005. The budget items related 
to the PRSP as part of the total Governmental budget areis planned to 
represent approximately 18% for the total period 2003-2005. The World 
Bank has expressed optimism regarding the new I-PRSP document, but a 
crucial concern continues to be the lack of capacity to implement the plans 
outlined. 
3.6 Options for Economic Development 
To sum up, Angola currently has the best possibility in years to rebuild its 
economy and develop conditions for broad-based economic growth and 
poverty reduction. A main challenge will be to develop a credible strategy for 
poverty reduction based on macroeconomic stability, transparency in public 
financial management, pro-poor budgeting, and strategies for promoting 
income-generating activities in urban as well as rural areas.   
 
Given the focus by IMF on transparency in oil management operations as well 
as transparency in budget execution and public financial management, a 
concise test of the will for necessary reform will be the signing of a new 
agreement between the Government of Angola and IMF. The steps recently 
taken by the Government give cause for cautious optimism. 
 
Another crucial test is the PRSP process. The progress recently achieved also 
gives reason for cautious optimism, but there are still substantial concerns 
regarding the capacity to implement the strategy given the weak capacity at 
local level.  
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With regard to income generating activities and the potential for non-oil sector 
growth, the strength of forces with a self-interest in hampering necessary legal 
reforms and transparency should not be underrated. Conditions for income-
generating activities are also negatively influenced by powerful forces 
benefiting from corrupt practices, including invisible monopolies and 
counterproductive fees extracted from potential entrepreneurs. 
 
As in Mozambique and many other African countries, the reform process 
should be seen in the context of internal national contentions. The struggle is 
between forces in Angolan society demanding reform, transparency and 
accountability in the use of public resources on the one hand, and 
countervailing forces with a self-interest in the status quo on the other. Given 
the huge natural resources in Angola, the enormous income generated from oil 
exploitation, and the powerful forces benefiting from a system without 
transparency, the strength of the forces favouring the status quo in Angolan 
society is considerable.  
 
The international community, including Norway, has a potential role to play 
in supporting reform processes in Africa. This could be done by identifying 
agents for change in society and supporting those agents in a proper way. 
Secondly, it could also be done through a dialogue with the Government 
focusing on reform in public financial management and implementation of 
PRSPs, although given the low dependency on foreign financing in Angola the 
possibility for the latter option is weaker in Angola than in many other 
African countries.  
 
It may be argued that given the future projections of oil income, the Angolan 
Government could maintain its position without an agreement with the IMF, a 
PRSP or support from donors. There are, however, indications of an increased 
will by the Angolan government to establish closer relationships with the 
international community. This can be understood in the light of several 
factors. Firstly, Angola has a need for short-term assistance related to 
rehabilitation after the war. Secondly, conditions for borrowing will be better 
for Angola when an agreement with the IMF is signed. Thirdly, the increased 
focus on governance and peer reviews in regional institutions such as NEPAD 
and SADC means that criticism from the international community related to 
inadequate transparency could become more problematic for the Angolan 
Government. And finally, there are potential alternative power bases that 
could be strengthened and attract more attention from the international 
community if the government does not deliver reforms.   
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4. Poverty and Vulnerability 
It is generally acknowledged that Angola exhibits some of the most serious 
indicators of poverty and vulnerability in the world. The country ranks 164 
out of 175 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index, despite its 
relatively high GDP per capita of USD 2040 (UNDP 2003). In fact, few 
countries in the world show a higher discrepancy between GDP per capita and 
HDI rank – with the HDI reflecting health and levels of education in addition 
to income. 
 
Understanding and alleviating poverty will be the main challenge for the 
Angolan government as well as the international community in the years to 
come. For the government it is not only a question of improving the appalling 
living conditions of the large majority of its own population, but also of 
avoiding unrest and desperation that may jeopardise its own survival. For the 
international community, to help alleviate immediate humanitarian crises and 
poverty are the only plausible rationale for giving aid to a country where the 
government should be in a position to help its own population. 
 
The basic characteristics of the socio-economic conditions in Angola are 
reproduced in Table 6 below. Perhaps the most serious figures are the high 
child mortality rate (a strong indication of combined poverty and absence of 
basic services like clean water, vaccination and health facilities) and the low 
level of school enrolment (meaning that the majority of Angolan children face 
a bleak future). Moreover, the adult literacy rate is significantly higher for 
men (46 percent) than for women (16 percent) in a context where women are 
forced to take on an increasingly central role in providing for family well-
being (see below). Equally significantly, the figures on poverty have not seen 
any substantial improvement the past decade, with Angola’s rank in terms if 
Human Development having continued to drop in recent years (UNDP 2003). 
With the opening up of large formerly UNITA-controlled areas previously out 
of reach for population and poverty surveys, figures are likely to deteriorate 
even further before the peace dividend hopefully will have an impact.  
 
Important for future developments is also the fact that inequalities are 
increasing in Angolan society. In other words, the trend is not only that the 
poor are getting poorer but also that the rich are getting richer – implying that 
national resources are not channelled into the alleviation of poverty but to the 
enrichment of the better off. The top decile’s share of urban household income 
rose from 32 percent in 1995 to 39 percent in 2002, and the Gini-coefficient 
rose from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.51 in 2000/2001 (UN 2003).4 Two studies by INE 
(2001) from urban areas in Angola confirm that there was a substantial 
worsening of poverty in the second half of the 1990s. Although the overall 
proportion of urban households living below the poverty line rose only slightly 
                                                 
4 The Gini-coefficient measures inequality over the entire distribution of income and 
consumption. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, and a value of 100 represents perfect 
inequality. 
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(from 61 to 63 percent), the proportion living in extreme poverty more than 
doubled from 13 to 28 percent (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Table 6: Social Indicators (1999-2002) 
INDICATOR  
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  
Human Development Index (HDI) 0.422 
HDI ranking (out of 175) 164 
GDP per capita (USD) 2040 
POPULATION AND URBANISATION  
Population growth rate (%) 3.0 
Total fertility rate (per women) 6.6 
% of population in urban areas 60 
DISPLACEMENT  
Total reported IDPs (million) 4.0 
Confirmed IDPs 1.5 
URBAN POVERTY  
% below poverty line (USD 1.68 per day) 63.2 
% in extreme poverty (USD 0.75 per day) 24.7 
URBAN INEQUALITY  
Share of income among poorest 40 percent (%) 13 
Share of income among richest 20 percent (%) 56 
LIFE EXPECTANCY AND MORTALITY  
Life expectancy at birth (years) 40.2 
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 172 
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 295 
HIV/AIDS  
HIV prevalence rate (population 15-49) (%) 8.6 
EDUCATION  
Net primary enrolment ratio males (%) 54 
Net primary enrolment ratio females (%) 42 
Primary, secondary, tertiary enrolment ratio (%) 29 
 
Source: Hodges 2003, UNDP 2003 
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Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While figures on poverty are clear enough to substantiate a description of 
extreme poverty and vulnerability in Angola, population and poverty data are 
still inadequate to show national variations, long-term trends and processes of 
impoverishment in urban and rural areas. The weakness of Angolan data on 
poverty and socio-economic differentiation is indicated by the large number of 
“blank” spaces in global reports on poverty and human development, notably 
those of the World Bank (World Bank 2003) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 2003). Some of the structural problems of 
measuring poverty and capturing variations and trends in Angola are obvious: 
there has not been a proper population census since 1972 – with current 
population figures being based on extrapolations from that census and 
estimates from humanitarian agencies where methodologies and samples vary. 
An estimated four million of the approximately 16 million people in Angola 
were on the move as deslocados in 2002 according to government sources. 
And whereas only approximately 15 percent of the population lived in urban 
areas at independence in 1975, it is now generally believed that at least half of 
the population live in cities and towns, with the population of Luanda alone 
being an estimated three million people. Added to this is the fact that the large 
majority of Angolans are not formally registered in any coherent national 
registration system, and their movements are consequently not recorded. 
 
Because of the war and the inaccessibility of large parts of Angola, most 
poverty data that do exist are based on the situation in Luanda and a few 
selected additional towns. Many analysts and aid workers argue that “Luanda 
is not Angola”, which of course is mistaken given the fact that the capital 
alone contains around 20 percent of the country’s population and large parts 
of the poor target groups. Nevertheless, rural areas not only have a large 
proportion of the population but are also central for Angola’s overall 
development with its substantial agricultural potential. There are, in fact, 
reasons to believe that the situation in the rural areas is currently even more 
difficult than in the towns. Large sections of the most able-bodied part of the 
rural population have been uprooted, often leaving older people, women and 
children behind. War and landmines have left large agricultural areas 
inaccessible to those who depend on them. In addition, the breakdown of 
1995
Moderate 
poor; 54 Extreme 
poor; 13
Non-poor; 
33
2000/2001
Extreme 
poor; 28
Non-poor; 
37
Moderate 
poor; 35
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markets for agricultural tools, seeds and products tends to limit production of 
both subsistence and cash crops.  
 
Ideally, measuring poverty and inequality on an overall national level, thereby 
making comparisons and contrasts possible, should be done in different ways 
(see e.g. May 2001). At one level, objective social indicators such as income 
levels, consumption expenditure, life expectancy and housing standards should 
be distinguished from subjective indicators based upon the attitudes, needs, 
perceptions and priorities gathered directly from people through the use of 
participatory research methodologies. People’s own perceptions of their 
poverty are central, because this is primarily what their actions and responses 
to external interventions are based on. 
 
At another level, measures of poverty can reflect the constituents of well-
being, or they can be measures of the access that people have to the 
determinants of well-being. Indices of wealth, welfare and human rights are 
examples of the first approach, whereas indices regarding the availability of 
shelter, health care, educational facilities and income are generally examples of 
the second. In the current context of Angola, priority should be given to 
monetary measures that are practical, allow for interpersonal comparisons and 
are fairly good proxies for standards of living. Nevertheless, the more 
dimensions of poverty and inequality are used, the more realistic the picture 
will be, and the better the chances are for effective poverty alleviation 
measures. 
 
It is also important to understand localised social relations of poverty – or 
access to social capital in a more conventional terminology – between the state 
and local communities, between urban and rural areas, within communities, 
within households and between individuals. This was emphasised in the 
comprehensive “Programme of Community Rehabilitation and National 
Reconciliation” for the Round Table Conference of Donors in Brussels in 
1995, which noted that “reconstruction of Angola depends on the capacity to 
rehabilitate economic and social infrastructures through community 
rehabilitation and reconstruction programs.” Under conditions of extreme 
poverty and stress such as persist in Angola, immediate social relationships 
within families and communities become crucial for survival both in peoples’ 
daily lives and at times of particular hardship and stress. There are indications 
that such relationships have been significantly changed after years of conflict 
and social upheaval, and understanding how they work will be as important 
for the ability of communities to take part in their own development and the 
targeting of poverty alleviation interventions as more conventional 
quantitative data. 
  
At the level of communities, understanding the role and importance of 
community organisations and authorities becomes crucial. Limited evidence 
suggests that new authority structures have developed in the absence of the 
state and the Party – often contested between “traditional “ authorities and 
the young and better-educated local “elite”. There is also evidence that war 
and stress have made people seek comfort and security in religion and a 
revitalisation of witchcraft as “thoroughly modern manifestations of 
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uncertainties, moral disquiet and unequal rewards in the contemporary 
moment, and better understood as a matter of social diagnostic than belief” 
(Moore and Saunders 2001). We also know too little about community-based 
organisations and associations for community management, provision of 
social services, provision of finance and credit and religious and social affairs – 
but we do know that they are important in other similar contexts. 
 
At the level of households and individuals, preliminary evidence from Luanda 
implies that extreme poverty forces households to withdraw and primarily 
take care of themselves, as indicated by the title of the study “Here in the city 
there is nothing left over for a lending hand” by Paul Robson and Sandra 
Roque (2001). They argue that there is very little room for collective action, 
and that what does take place is usually initiated by the church. Judged by 
comparative material from other countries in the region it is also likely that 
there are internal processes of marginalisation, where the very poorest are 
excluded from social networks and relations simply because people do not 
have the means to support others in commoditised social settings where 
everything costs money.  
 
Let me end this discussion on the need for comprehensive and profound data 
on poverty by outlining some of the main findings from a study carried out by 
Save the Children UK (Sirajo Seidi et al. 2000). 
On Social Relations of Poverty 
· Formal sector employment is scarce and mostly performed by men. Four in 
every five women work in the informal urban economy. 
· Women and girls are increasingly the primary breadwinners for households 
and work longer hours than men. Data from survey and focus group 
discussions reveal that women head an increasing number of households. 
However, the question of who primarily controls the income in male-
headed households has not been addressed.  
· Most households are extended families despite high rates of urbanisation. 
Households generally include a single adult or a couple living with their 
own children but related adults and children such as brothers and sisters-
in-law, older aunts and uncles, and children of other relatives are all part 
of the same economic unit. 
· Most parents can afford only to send their children to informal schools 
that offer no qualifications but are cheaper, with fewer indirect costs, and 
offer flexibility in fee payments. Children are readily available when 
needed for other household duties. 
· Increasingly, residents are substituting informal private for public health 
services such as self-prognosis and medication, the advice of mobile 
pharmacists, and the use of private health posts, which are growing at a 
phenomenal rate in better-off areas. Survey data suggest that low prices 
and location are the major determinants in health care use patterns among 
the poor. 
· Virtually everybody in the community depends on the market to acquire 
food. An insignificant number of households complement their purchases 
with home-grown foods or transfers from relatives in the provinces. Lack 
C M I 
 25 
of space and water constrains farming in peri-urban areas. The relative 
inaccessibility of most parts of the country makes inter-family transfers a 
difficult task. 
On Gender 
· As most men are not employed, women and girls carry a disproportionate 
responsibility for income generation for most families. They are involved in 
all types of business, including the trading of food, drinks, second-hand 
clothing, and so on. 
· Separation and divorce rates are high. Women are often left alone to raise 
children and care for the rest of the household, with little or no support 
from their former husbands or partners. Men tend to remarry rapidly after 
divorce or separation. 
· Women spend most of the day working outside the household. Average 
observed working hours among women are over 12 hours a day. Their 
busy daily schedules impose constraints on childcare, well-being and other 
domestic responsibilities often carried out by women in the household. 
On Youngsters 
· Most of the young people, particularly boys who do not go to school, are 
unemployed and sit idle in the community with very few opportunities. 
Most depend on their families for housing, food and clothing. Some are 
learning practical skills as mechanics, masons, electricians, etc. Success 
stories are few, however. The vast majority end up working as daily 
labourers in the local markets loading and unloading trucks, pushing carts 
and carrying merchandise for women merchants. 
· Not surprisingly, most girls also do not study. The difference is more 
striking when we look at time allocation for girls aged 10 to 13 years of 
age. On average they spend over 64% of their time performing domestic 
work and rent-generating activities. 
· The largest part of the domestic work is left as the responsibility of the 
young children (usually girls). They spend, on average, over 7.5 hours a 
day working between domestic responsibilities and income-generating 
activities. Girls aged between 10 and 13 years of age are primarily 
responsible for childcare, although occasionally children are left alone with 
neighbours or older relatives living with the family. 
On Children 
· Children contribute to the family income. Some even carry the 
responsibility for providing for the entire family. Children not only help by 
working in their parents’ businesses, but have their own retail businesses to 
meet their own needs. 
· Most children have overburdened daily schedules with domestic work, 
income-generating and childcare responsibilities as their parents or 
guardians devote a growing share of their time to activities outside the 
household. Nonetheless, most children think of making a contribution to 
the family livelihood not simply as a burden but also as a self-confidence 
building exercise. 
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Knowledge of the magnitude, nature and processes of poverty production are 
crucial for designing poverty alleviation policies and realistic programmes and 
projects. From the limited number of studies in existence we clearly see the 
contours of significant developments. Communities tend to become less 
coherent under poverty and distress; social groups, and particularly 
unemployed men, become increasingly marginalised and isolated; and children 
bear a heavy burden, ‘losing’ their childhood, with few if any prospects of a 
better future. Contributing to a better understanding of poverty and social 
processes should be an important area of responsibility for international aid.  
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5. Development Aid and Social 
Responsibility 
With the combination of peace, a continued or even worsening humanitarian 
crisis, and an apparent unwillingness by the Government to contribute 
significantly to poverty alleviation, the international community is faced with 
difficult choices (IEU 2003:14). Put bluntly, it has two options. It can either 
jump in to fill the gap and provide a substitute for necessary government 
action or reforms, which will let the political elite off the hook once more and 
may have serious long-term consequences for governance and political 
stability. Or it can hold back emergency and development aid in the hope that 
the government will eventually respond, which is considered equally 
distressing given the gravity of the current situation and the likelihood that the 
government stance will not change. For a number of countries, including 
Norway, the complexity of the situation is further exacerbated by their 
involvement in the Angolan economy through the oil sector. 
 
Development aid to Angola represented 268 million USD in 2001 (see Table 
7). The largest multilateral donor was the European Union, with the United 
States and Japan being the largest bilateral donors. Nevertheless, this aid 
represented only 10.2 percent of the Angolan state budget, which is 
considerably less than for many other countries in the region, including 
Mozambique with 52 percent. Albeit not important for the Angolan 
government, however, external aid is absolutely crucial for the Angolan 
population due to the limited involvement by government in emergencies and 
the social sectors. From a peak in the mid-1990s – with an annual average of 
USD 447 million in 1994-1996 – development aid to Angola declined to an 
annual average of USD 357 million in 1997-1999. The level of aid has not 
increased significantly since the peace agreement of April 2002, as many 
donors link their aid to improved relationships between the Government and 
the IMF, to the still unfinished Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and 
to the Round Table Conference still in waiting.   
 
Table 7: Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Angola 2001 
DAC-Countries USD mn Multi-lateral USD mn 
United States 34.0 EC (EU) 60.5 
Japan 20.7 IDA 10.8 
Netherlands 20.5 UNICEF 7.2 
Norway 17.5 Other multilateral 7.6 
Sweden 13.4 Other 3.8 
Portugal 11.9   
Other 61.4 Total ODA 268.4 
Source: OECD/DAC 2003 
 
In the new post-conflict situation two broad sets of strategies are recognised in 
the aid community. The “Swedish model” is one of limited aid and “wait and 
see”. It emphasises the need for donors to fulfil the basic principles of 
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development aid, and for the Angolan government to use its resources and 
take on the responsibility for its own development. More specifically, the 
strategy involves a careful approach with an emphasis on emergency aid and 
support to alternative voices, such as civil society, women, children and 
independent research institutions. The aid is primarily channelled through the 
multilateral system, or national and international private organisations. An 
increase in aid allocations and extension of sectors and channels will only take 
place if the government clearly demonstrates its will to contribute to its own 
development by greater transparency in the economy and a significant increase 
in the allocation to social sectors. If this does not happen within a reasonable 
period of time, development cooperation will be phased out.   
 
The alternative “EU model” is more proactive. It stresses Angola’s 
considerable economic potential, important regional political role and the 
country’s importance as a trade partner. The point of departure is that Angola 
needs international support to develop, and that patience related to political 
and economic developments is necessary given the country’s past history of 
war and turmoil. Such a strategy implies continued emergency aid primarily 
through the multilateral system, and parallel bilateral support to important 
sectors in the Angolan economy from physical infrastructure (roads, 
electricity, water) to the social sectors (health and education). It also places 
considerable emphasis on support to the private sector, by contributing to a 
supportive environment for foreign investment and direct support to private 
companies. Recent developments, where the World Bank appears to be trying 
to take on a donor coordination role from the United Nations and to be 
pushing the “EU model” to the extreme, are worrying. By entering large-scale 
agreements with the Angolan government, e.g. in the educational sector, 
before an agreement with the IMF and an I-PRSP are in place, the World Bank 
may be encouraging the Angolan government to disregard pressure from its 
more “demanding” aid partners and “go bilateral”, as in their political 
relationships. In fact, there are signs that the government has “shelved” the 
PRSP process. 
 
The Norwegian government has recently published its own “Strategic 
Framework. Angola 2003-2005” (MFA 2003). It includes assessments of 
foreign policy and development aid as well as private sector development, 
particularly in the oil sector. The Strategy may be interpreted as a middle way 
between the Swedish and the EU models, but it may also be seen as a “strategy 
without a strategy” by failing to take up key issues in Norway’s involvement 
in Angola. This is epitomised by the fact that i) Angola does not live up to 
central conditions in Norway’s development policy of good governance and 
social responsibility, and ii) that Norway’s income from involvement in the oil 
sector is likely to become substantial and hence represent vital interests not 
only for the oil companies but also for the Norwegian government. The 
question the Norwegian government will be faced with – and for which it 
needs a strategy and a set of benchmarks – is how far removed from the 
principles of Norwegian foreign, aid and private sector development policies a 
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country can be before Norway should no longer be involved, or should 
substantially change its involvement.5 
 
The essence of the strategy as it stands seems to be i) that Norway will 
maintain its development aid to Angola at the current level through the period 
2003-2005; ii) that the aid will be concentrated in a limited number of sectors 
where Norway is particularly well positioned; iii) that the bilateral channel 
will be given increasing emphasis; iv) that improving conditions for 
commercial relationships should be given increasing attention; and v) that 
Norway dos not foresee aid to Angola beyond a medium-to-long term 
(“mellomlang sikt”) as the Angolan government should be able to take care of 
its own development, leaving open the question of what will happen if it does 
not. The strategy also states that Norway’s policy towards Angola will be 
reassessed at the end of the period 2003-2005, which as it stands makes it 
difficult to enter longer-term agreements of any type. 
 
Norway’s development aid budget to Angola has been stable at around NOK 
150 million (USD 20 million) over the past few years. In 2002 the overall 
programme amounted to NOK 177 million, of which NOK 110 million came 
from development funding, NOK 10 million from transitional funding and 
NOK 57 million from humanitarian funds (NORAD 2003). The main focus of 
Norwegian cooperation in Angola has been i) emergency assistance and 
support to programmes aimed at poverty reduction and better access to basic 
social services; ii) institution building aimed at improving the management of 
natural resources; iii) support to institutional reforms in the areas of 
governance, human security, democratisation and transparency; and iv) 
support to civil society initiatives in the areas of community development, 
human rights, peacebuilding and organisational development (see Figure 3). 
 
Norwegian development aid is implemented under considerable constraints, 
with the limited competence and capacity of the Angolan partners often 
causing delays and reassessments in its implementation. This includes projects 
involving “heavy” sectors such as energy and oil, as well as smaller NGO 
projects. At the overall level long-term bilateral aid is to be coordinated by no 
fewer than four ministries, and there is no formal bilateral agreement between 
the Angolan and Norwegian governments as is the case in most other 
cooperation countries. In practice, cooperation with the Angolan government 
has been implemented on a sectoral basis through the Ministry of Energy and 
Water (legal frameworks, resource mapping and human resource 
development); the Ministry of Petroleum (legal frameworks, regulation, 
resource mapping and human development); the Ministry of Planning (Fundo 
de Apoio Social (FAS), the PRSP process and statistics); and the Ministry of 
Fisheries (research, policy development, human resource development). Albeit 
only representing a part of the Norwegian aid budget to Angola, Norway has 
been one of the major donors in the country with state-to-state programmes.  
 
                                                 
5 Recent and ongoing debates in the Norwegian media have singled out Angola as a country 
where that threshold may soon be reached if significant changes do not take place around the 
issues of transparency, corruption and social responsibility. 
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Figure 3: Norwegian Aid to Angola by Sector 2000-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account the weak Angolan government sector, the major part of 
the Norwegian aid programme has hitherto been channelled through the 
multilateral system or civil society. The former includes UNDP (a broadly 
based governance programme in support of the Country Cooperation 
Framework in the areas of environment, administrative reform, hiv/aids, the 
PRSP process, Millennium Development Goal promotion and human rights); 
UNICEF (support to education, hiv/aids intervention, water and sanitation); 
UNHCR (repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries); OCHA 
(Emergency Relief Fund); WFP (food assistance and logistics operations); FAO 
(seeds and tools) and HRD-UNOA (capacity building and direct support to 
activities in civil society). While the UNDP and UNICEF are particularly 
important for transitional and long-term development cooperation, the other 
agencies primarily deal with emergencies that may now be scaling down. 
 
Aid channelled through non-government organisations has primarily been 
implemented by Norwegian NGOs, often without much cooperation with 
Angolan partners (Tvedten 2001). In 2002, 44 percent of Norwegian bilateral 
aid was channelled through NGOs, with Norwegian NGOs representing 39 
percent and local NGOs 5 percent of the total. The major Norwegian NGOs 
are the Norwegian People’s Aid (mine action, health and community); the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (emergency education and humanitarian 
assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced people); Redd Barna 
(protection and education); YME (water and sanitation); and Norwegian 
Church Aid (humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and support to church 
organisations). Other smaller NGOs active in Angola include the Norwegian 
Teachers’ Union; the Norwegian Methodist Church and ICDP (working with 
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child protection). A limited number of the more than 300 Angolan NGOs are 
strong, have considerable capacity and have become increasingly important in 
Norwegian development aid. These include ADRA (institutional support); 
Mãos Livres (legal aid); and Development Workshop (peacebuilding). Finally 
Norwegian research institutions (CMI, FAFO) cooperate with local 
counterparts (such as AIP) using NORAD funding. 
 
The current Norwegian aid portfolio thus represents a broad variety and large 
number of different programmes and projects. There are good reasons for this. 
In a complex and unpredictable aid environment such as that found in Angola, 
the basis for longer-term projects may easily change, and with the limited 
absorption capacity of most partner institutions smaller projects often have a 
better chance of success. It is true that such a large number of projects may 
easily overstretch the capacity of the Embassy staff, who also have heavy 
responsibilities related to Norwegian private companies present in Angola and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, but from an aid perspective the strategy 
has, in our view, been the correct one.  
 
The new Strategy for 2003-2005 foresees a stronger concentration of the 
project portfolio, moving from emergency and transitional aid to longer-term 
programmes. State-to-state cooperation in the areas of energy, oil and water 
will continue, and there are clear indications that education will be a new area 
of concentration. There are, in principle, good reasons for increasing 
cooperation with the state: the competence, capacity and legitimacy of state 
institutions are essential for longer-term development, and one-sided support 
to parallel institutions (in the multilateral aid system, the private sector and 
civil society) may jeopardise long-term stability. At the same time, however, 
such a focus will imply less flexibility in the planning and implementation of 
Norwegian aid in a situation where the commitment of the government to 
social development is far from certain – and where the danger of ending up in 
a situation of gap-filling is pre-eminent. In short, the time does not seem to be 
ripe for a stronger concentration around state-to-state development 
cooperation. 
 
Private sector development is raised as another area of concentration in the 
Strategy. Both NORFUND and INTSOK are currently present in Angola, in 
addition to a large number of oil-related companies that are in the country on 
a purely commercial basis. While Angola’s resources and economic potential 
cater well for cooperation in the private sector, competence and capacity 
outside the oil sector is still extremely weak. NORFUND has been in contact 
with more than 90 private companies since its establishment in Angola in 
2002, but only 10-12 have been found to meet the necessary requirements and 
no projects have yet been set in motion. A local investment fund involving 
Angolan financial and industrial partners will be established by the end of this 
year. The recent “Diagnostic Study on Private Sector Development in Angola” 
(The Bridge Group 2002) puts forward the same argument of a weak and 
fragmented private sector outside the oil industry, but still concludes that 
Norway should fund schemes for exports to and investment in Angola. As we 
see it, the private sector is promising for Norwegian development aid , but still 
emerges as a risky and potentially costly undertaking.  
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What makes Angola so special is the fact that foreign oil companies, including 
Norwegian Statoil and Norsk Hydro, potentially have a much stronger impact 
on developments in Angola than the aid community. They have a strong 
leverage through their crucial financial and technological importance for the 
Angolan authorities and could – with concerted efforts – be in a position to 
influence Angolan policies on peace, reconstruction and development. There 
are, of course, good reasons to argue that this should not be the role of private 
commercial companies, but the counter-argument is that these companies are 
already complicit in the diversion of oil earnings, lack of transparency and 
human rights violations in Angola by not pushing harder than they do for 
openness and a responsible government.  
 
Their main potential contribution to social responsibility is related to fiscal 
transparency, making it possible for the Angolan public to hold the 
government to account (Howen 2002). Such transparency should include 
figures on total signature bonuses, total net production by block, total 
aggregate payment made to Sonangol under its Production Sharing 
Agreements, and total taxes and levies paid to the government. While the oil 
companies have started to publish more such figures, largely as a result of 
international pressure (with BP generally considered to be the most responsible 
company in this respect), large transfers are still not properly accounted for – 
or are accounted for in ways that make them inaccessible for the general 
international and Angolan public. Despite the external pressure for increased 
transparency, most companies apparently see this as counterproductive to the 
ultimate goal of profit maximisation and argue that they are contractually 
bound not to publish figures on financial transfers. 
 
Secondly, the oil companies are contractually bound to make social bonus 
payments to Sonangol as part of their signature bonus and Production Sharing 
Agreement, parts of which have been channelled to the government. This 
means that the oil companies directly fund a significant part of the 
government’s humanitarian efforts. The oil companies have probably paid a 
combined total of between USD 220-400 million into the Social Bonus Funds, 
which is 1.5 times the annual multilateral aid budget. The companies 
themselves have a limited ability to influence the use of this money, even 
though part of it has been opened to tender from private companies and 
development organisations. A significant part is thought to be channelled to 
the Fundo de Eduardo dos Santos (FESA) – a foundation considered by its 
critics to be a “state-within-the-state” and outside democratic control. 
 
Finally, oil companies are involved in direct social responsibility spending. 
This includes all the major companies active in the country (such as Chevron, 
ExxonMobile, TotalFinaElf and BP), as well as smaller actors such as Norsk 
Hydro and Statoil and the large number of Norwegian companies active in the 
supply sector. Statoil will spend a total of 1,455,000 USD on corporate social 
investment projects in 2003, of which 890,000 USD is administered by the 
company itself through various development organisations and 565,000 USD 
by the operating partner companies from blocks 15, 17 and 31.  
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According to Statoil’s own guidelines, their primary contribution to the 
communities in which they operate is “measured in terms of value creation, or 
the impact of their investment on employment, tax revenues, transfers of skills 
and technology, procurement of goods and services and social infrastructure.” 
In addition, social investment projects are seen to have a triple purpose: i) they 
increase the company’s understanding of the societies in which they operate, 
thereby improving risk management and their ability to operate under 
demanding circumstances; ii) they enable the company to contribute more 
directly to sustainable development in the local communities; and iii) they are 
of crucial importance for the company’s reputation both locally and 
internationally.  
 
Traditionally, the oil industry’s involvement in development projects has been 
accompanied by a degree of local sponsorship and philanthropic 
contributions, an approach apparently still largely followed by Norsk Hydro 
(see Table 8). Figures on Hydro’s Social Responsibility Spending for 2003 
have not been forwarded, but the budget for 2001 was USD 497,850 (Tvedten 
2002:24).  
 
 
Table 8: Hydro’s Support to Social Development  
PROJECT PARTNER 
INSTITUTION 
Water drilling in Quengela, Luanda Province Sonangol 
Rural schools in Quengela, Luanda Province Sonangol 
Management and technology transfer programme Sonangol 
Teacher training and school facilities ADDP 
Transportation and distribution of fertilisers  ADRA 
University Scholarships Catholic University 
High school scholarships UWC 
Teaching Emergency Programme NRC 
Health centre and library Methodist Church 
Books and classrooms Catholic Church 
Schools, health centres, hospitals FESA 
Traumatised children ICDP 
Fund-raising, mosquito nets, schools etc. Hydro 
Mini Tennis Programme Ang. Tennis Fed. 
Norway Cup Angonord 
Sports sponsorships Ang.Fed / JEA 
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Statoil has made a deliberate policy choice of working through organisations 
which have the necessary expertise and capacity. They currently have 
cooperation agreements with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Norwegian Red Cross 
and Amnesty International. In addition, they support locally based institutions 
such as Development Aid from People to People (ADPP) and the Ministry of 
Petroleum (MINPET). The main sectors of concentration are health, good 
governance, education and demining. Table 9 below presents the proposed 
distribution of support for 2004. 
 
Table 9: Statoil Social Responsibility Spending 2004 (Statoil Operated) 
Organisation Type of Activity Budget (USD) 
Norw. People’s Aid  300,000 
Norw.Refugee Council   150,000 
Norw. Red Cross  60,000 
ADPP  30,000 
YME  20,000 
UNHCR  180,000 
MINPET  50,000 
Others  80,000 
Total  890,000 
Source: Statoil 
 
According to Statoil’s own Social Investment Guidelines “[t]he scale of 
Statoil’s social investments should be considered in light of the stage of 
business development and the size of our revenues in the country at stake”. 
While Statoil’s level of social investment in Angola can be debated, given its 
large-scale involvement and prospects of future profits, the company should be 
recommended for channelling its investments through development 
organisations rather than more philanthropic institutions, where their 
investments might have been more visible but the development impact more 
dubious. 6 
 
Returning finally to Norway’s Angola Strategy 2003-2005, the potentially 
crucial role of the state-controlled Norwegian oil companies to the 
development of Angola – and the crucial role of Angola for Norwegian oil 
companies and the Norwegian State – should have been given a more 
prominent place in a strategy encompassing foreign policy and aid policy as 
well as private sector development policy. Figures on total investments and 
revenues have not been forwarded by the companies, but there are substantial 
sums involved. According to a recent report  (The Bridge Group 2002), the net 
cash flow to Statoil and Norsk Hydro will reach a plateau of about 700 
million USD per year by about 2007 (based on proven reserves only). As a 
dominating shareholder, the Norwegian Government’s pro-rata share of this 
cash-flow will be in the order of more than 4 billion NOK per year. This is 
more than the Norwegian government spends on ODA to the whole of Africa 
per year.  
                                                 
6 In fact, the challenge seems greater for some of their cooperating partners, in particular 
organisations like Amnesty International that simultaneously have a role as watchdogs over 
human rights and the corporate behaviour of Norwegian companies in developing countries. 
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The oil companies as commercial actors could, and from their point of view 
perhaps should, be more restrictive regarding the responsibility they take on 
for development and human rights in Angola. It is, in the end, the Norwegian 
government that has to make an assessment of whether Norway and the state-
owned oil companies will continue to be active in Angola if conditions of 
human rights, poverty and mismanagement continue to deteriorate.  
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6. Decentralisation and Development  
This part of the CMI Angola 2002/2003 report aims to map out the main 
characteristics of the local governance system in Angola and the reforms 
which are in preparation in this field.7 Its main focus will be on power 
relations and politics, rather than on the technicalities and administrative 
details of local development challenges. The previous chapters portrayed the 
immense challenges brought about by a war-ravaged and oil-dependent 
economy, an impoverished population, and a lack of pro-poor governance. 
Here, we shall not deliberate on local government’s obvious role in the 
amelioration of these problems, or on administrative dysfunctionalities and 
calls for ‘fiscal transparency’ or ‘competitive salary structures’ that are put 
forward so often these days (ISG 2003), although such measures are no doubt 
needed. The study will instead focus on how the current ‘deconcentration and 
decentralisation’ reform process – a key ingredient in the ‘good governance’ 
tool-box – will or will not transform or restructure the Angolan state, and 
then assess whether the process will result in expected and desired results.  
 
As good governance ranks high on the international development 
organisations’ agendas, donors want to make sure that democratic 
decentralisation becomes a fact, and that the process actually contributes to 
development and pro-poor governance. This study raises some crucial 
questions about key issues to follow in Angola’s decentralisation process in the 
years to come.  
 
Chapter 6 will present the theoretical considerations informing the subsequent 
analysis.  The next two chapters will outline and discuss both de facto and de 
jure aspects of the country’s local government, the distribution of power and 
authority, and its political culture. The last chapter looks at some experiences 
of development organisations and their interaction with the local government 
structures, and raises some paramount questions for planners of development 
action. 
 
In Angola, all current government structures below the level of the national 
government are referred to as local government – or more precisely, as the 
local organs of the state. This includes the dominant level in the local 
government system, the provincial governments, of which there are 18. 
Beneath this level are the much weaker administrations of the municipios and 
comunas. The reader will need to be aware of this terminology, and these 
bodies’ ambiguous status. Even if they could be considered local governments, 
they are still hierarchically closely tied to and integrated into the central state 
apparatus. As will become evident, decentralised and autonomous local 
governments have yet to be created. 
                                                 
7 The analysis is based on field work carried out in Luanda and Huambo provinces in 
September 2003.  
C M I 
 37 
6.1  Is Decentralisation Currently Taking Place? 
When Angola became an independent country in 1975, it inherited a system of 
centralised government where the state power, based in the capital Luanda, 
exercised judicial and administrative dominance over the peoples of the 
national territory. As the country was ravaged by war the MPLA government 
installed, at least in the territories they controlled, a local government or 
‘administration’ based on the system of one-party rule. To this date, the cadre 
of the MPLA party and the local government/administration tend to be 
merged in person and in practice.  
 
Due to the war, significant areas and populations were left with only the most 
rudimentary presence of state authorities. A few months after the ceasefire 
deal between the Government forces and UNITA in early 2002 there 
appeared, for the first time since independence, a situation in which Luanda-
based state power could begin successful installation in the entire national 
territory.  
 
At the same time as the centralised state is extending its power and authority 
to all ‘municipalities’ and ‘communes’ in Angola by installing in these its 
administrations or local organs, a reform process is – at least nominally – 
taking place within the system of territorial administration. All noteworthy 
political players in Angola today pay homage to terms such as deconcentration 
and decentralisation, emphasising that the centralised system is ripe for 
reform. These terms will be discussed throughout this study.  
 
It should be made clear at the outset that at the time of writing, no political 
decentralisation has taken place in Angola. Although the constitutional law 
bodes well for the creation of elected local governments, no local elections 
have been held to date and there are neither any concrete plans nor a time 
schedule to hold such elections. A law for the creation of locally elected 
government bodies is in preparation by the government, but the law has yet to 
be presented to Parliament. Even with the approval of an eventual law 
regulating such bodies, few expect elected local bodies to be installed within 
the next few years.  
 
The impracticalities of over-centralised government and the need or desire for 
power sharing and power distribution in post-war Angola speak the same 
language: the  political climate is such that deconcentration, decentralisation 
and devolution of power have been put on the agenda.  
6.2 Decentralisation in Development Theory. What does 
it Say? 
A key, and perhaps necessary, element in the commonly accepted catch-phrase 
of ‘bringing government to the people’ is the decentralisation of government. 
Decentralisation is about empowering people in any given locality to make 
decisions about the local social and natural environment. Power may be 
handed over to local people in a democratic or an undemocratic way, and 
decentralisation could create democratic or undemocratic local institutions 
and power structures.  
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Any local government in a modern state is accountable and responsive in two 
directions: upwards, towards its superiors in the central state; and 
downwards, to its local constituency. A centralised system is one in which the 
local government is biased in its accountability towards its central state 
masters. This has been the case in Angola where local governments on all 
levels, from the provinces to the comunas, have been principally concerned 
with serving as administrators of policies formulated at higher levels. A 
decentralised system includes local policy-makers who are accountable to and 
respond principally to (at least sections of) the local population.  
 
There are several ways in which to define decentralisation. Crook and Manor 
(1998) draw a simple but useful distinction between decentralisation as 
deconcentration and as devolution.  
 
DECENTRALISATION AS DECONCENTRATION means that a central government 
transfers authority to other governmental institutions in a territorial hierarchy. 
This does not in itself imply local democracy. In some cases in Africa, for 
instance in Tanzania (Eriksen et al. 1999:56-58), this form of decentralisation 
in some periods actually became a cover for further strengthening the state’s 
powers to penetrate the entire territory, and for consolidating the state 
bureaucracy against local elites. Deconcentration is merely a relocation of 
public officers away from the capital; in fact, it often becomes a cover for the 
strengthening of a centralised state, and is often branded ‘administrative 
deconcentration’. In other cases, or hand in hand, deconcentration can be a 
way of making state service provision more effective at the local level.  
 
DECENTRALISATION AS DEVOLUTION of state power is the common form of 
decentralisation linked to democratisation. It means that the central 
government cedes power and authority to local government agencies and 
provides them with resources for independent management. These bodies are 
usually granted a ‘legal personality’, and given (limited) rights to tax and 
spend, relatively independent of central government directives and policies. 
They can even create their own by-laws, within a restricted judicial 
framework. These bodies are often branded ‘communes’ or ‘municipalities’. 
Yet even these local government bodies are not necessarily equal to local 
government, as their top officials might remain centrally appointed, for 
instance as head of a city council. The tendency in Africa during the 1980s 
and 1990s was to introduce local government elections, creating governmental 
bodies with extensive juridical independence.  
 
In the following, the term democratic decentralisation will refer to a process in 
which power and authority is devolved from the central state to local 
institutions in such a way that the local government institutions will be held 
accountable by the local population and that they will be responsive to the 
needs and demands of the local population as formulated in a universally 
democratic electoral process. 
 
A further point should be added. If democratic decentralisation is to have any 
real meaning and positive effects in terms of development and improved public 
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services, then decentralisation must be accompanied by transfers of resources 
so as not to create empty and incapacitated local governments which will fail 
to gain legitimacy and respect among the local populations. There are many 
African examples of the latter (Eriksen, Naustdalslid et al. 1999).8 In Angola, 
this is particularly relevant as the central state is resource rich and the local 
tax base is weak, and so, consequently, are the prospects for local income 
generation.  
6.3 The Bifurcated State Legacy: Rural Tradition and 
Urban ‘Modernity’ 
Any student of the Angolan state and society will be struck by the immense 
gulf between rural and urban social life. That is true, of course, for most parts 
of the world. There are some particularities, however, that Angola shares with 
many African countries. That is, up until fairly recent history the country and 
its people were ruled by a racist colonial power which had no taste for 
democracy or citizenship rights for the majority of the black African 
population which resided in the countryside. This section will highlight the 
colonial legacy of territorial/local administration. This legacy, and the ways in 
which it was taken up and perpetuated or transgressed by the post-colonial 
state, has immense repercussions today in everything from nation-building, 
citizenship, and democratic governance to local democracy. 
 
For the colonialists to rule the vast African territories, local administration 
could not be as it was in Europe or in the Europeanised cities, nor could they 
be ruled directly and by brute force alone. The real preoccupation of the 
colonial state was how to control the ‘bantu’ masses of the vast rural 
hinterlands, while continuously exploiting and abusing the human and natural 
resources of their territories. The solution became a system of indirect rule in 
which an alliance with the ‘traditional authorities’ and ‘chiefs’ proved vital. A 
special administrative system with African rural ‘functionaries’ of the central 
state had been found. As in many African countries, a strata of people 
appeared in the Angolan countryside branded ‘traditional authorities’, usually 
emanating from the royal or chiefly lineages of a given territory. The colonial 
state in Africa created with this system a historical separation between the 
europeanised social life in the urban areas, and the cultivation of the 
‘customary’ and the ‘traditional’ in the countryside. In Portuguese Angola, the 
principal tool for this separation was the laws encoded in the infamously racist 
‘Estatuto dos Indígenas’ which counted for all who had not achieved the level 
of ‘civilisation’ necessary for citizenship. 
 
By allying themselves with traditional authorities, at least those of their own 
liking, the colonial state gained at least some legitimacy locally by tapping into 
the authority of the traditional leaders. They were tied to the colonial state by 
force and by privileges such as salaries, uniforms and official recognition. 
Some leaders integrated entirely into the colonial administration, but in most 
places, the cultural-political leadership of the chiefs and royalties combined 
                                                 
8 In particular during the 1980s and 1990s when the African decentralisation process was 
often driven by the IFI’s wish to impose cost-saving measures on the central state, which could 
‘decentralise’ responsibility for local service provision to impoverished local councils.    
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the roles and functions demanded by them from the colonial administrations 
(as tax collectors, for instance) and those expected of a political and spiritual 
leader of the local community. Significantly, they were not always seen as 
defectors to the colonial oppressors. They were also to a large extent able to 
protect, or rather preserve, at least part of the local traditions as the colonial 
capitalist state took hold of their territories. At the same time the political 
significance of the ‘traditional’ was preserved and even encouraged by the 
colonial state, which saw it as a way of tying a heterogeneous mass of black 
peasants into the jurisdiction of the colonial state. Thus, ‘customary law’ was 
integrated into the colonial state’s judicial system. 
 
In fact, as Mahmood Mamdani famously coined it in his Citizen and Subject 
(1996), a ‘bifurcated state’ was created in Africa, in which the urban 
populations were integrated into the state as citizens (albeit, in the case of 
Africans, as ‘second rate’) subject to modern written law. The rural 
population, on the other hand, came to be ruled as subjects of a given 
‘ethnicity’ or ‘tribe’ which was ruled according to that particular group’s 
‘customs’ and ‘tribal tradition’. The custodians of the customary law were 
those accepted by the state as traditional authorities. The system ensured that 
several instances of power – legislative (local norms), judicial and 
bureaucratic-administrative – were merged in an autocratic way in one person, 
the chief. Countless localised conflicts arose throughout the continent as the 
traditional authorities installed by the colonial masters weren’t always 
accepted as local leaders by all,9 or as the local leaders thus installed 
transgressed the socially accepted confines of ‘custom’ and acted merely as 
local despots or autocrats. 
 
After independence, the bifurcated state was inherited by the new regimes. 
Some regimes sought to Africanise the state (Zaire, Cameroon) and simply 
continued the system of indirect rule, merely exchanging the rulers of the 
central state, but not locally. The more radical regimes (Mozambique, 
Ethiopia) sought to exchange indirect with direct rule, and endeavoured to 
quash the politico-administrative powers of the traditional authorities. 
Whichever way, it typically resulted in no more real a local democracy.  
 
To surmount the historical legacy of the bifurcated state and to install a 
system of ‘democratised’ local governance is a challenge that has seen few 
successes in Africa. A bridge must link governance in the rural areas (with 
traditions of autocratic leadership) with the modern state. As the system of 
indirect rule has left a history of localised despotism in Angola as well, the 
‘bifurcated’ state has also created unresolved tension between the rural and the 
urban ways of wielding local power.10 Democratic decentralisation could be 
one way of transcending such contradictions. 
                                                 
9 The chiefs and their subjects were, in the period of late colonialism, categorised through 
censuses and issued identity cards. But the entire local population of a given territory did not 
always accept the authority of the chiefs ‘assigned’ to them by the colonial census. 
10 In August 2003, a major news story concerned a court case against the governor of the 
Cuando Cubango province, accused of having authorised the execution of eight ‘traditional 
authorities’ for having engaged in ‘witchcraft’. 
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7. Angola’s Centralised Local Government 
System 
The Angolan polity, its government and administration, has from colonial 
times to this day been characterised by various arrangements of centralised 
power having the first, second and final word throughout the national 
territory, with the exception of those areas in which the Luanda-based 
government did not exercise power during the war. In cases where authority 
has been deconcentrated or relegated (for instance, to provincial governments 
or to traditional authorities), the state always ensured that it maintained the 
power to intervene and overrule. 
7.1 The Formal Set-up of Local State Power 
The following quote from the Ministry of Territorial Administration’s most 
recent study on the state of local administration in Angola includes a vital 
insight:  
 
The evolution of the system of Local Administration in Angola 
since 1975 to date does not present itself with total coherence 
between the constitutional principles, ordinary legislation and the 
local administrative practice driving its evolution. (MAT 
2002:ex.sum)  
 
The divergence between theory and practice is an understatement. Although 
the terms decentralisation and deconcentration have appeared in various laws 
organising the local government system, the tendency during the 1970s and 
1980s was to strengthen the centralisation of the state. For instance, law no. 
20/77 (to be read ‘number 20 of 1977’) did away with any differentiation 
between local and state finances, meaning that local bodies of the state could 
not keep any revenues for local spending. A series of other laws ensured that 
the MPLA party-state got a firm grip on the local administration, from 
Province to the lowest level.11 
 
The Angolan territorial division has three main layers covering the entire 
territory. In hierarchical order these are: Provinces, of which there are 18; 
Municipios, of which there are 164; and 557 Comunas.12 To a large extent, 
the mapping of the administrative borders was inherited from the Portuguese 
administration.  
 
                                                 
11 See Guedes Marques Guedes, A., et al. 2003. Pluralismo e Legitimacão - A edificacão pós-
colonial de Angola. Coimbra: Livraria Alemedina., for a legal history of the public 
administration in Angola (in Portuguese).  
12 In the following, the Portuguese terms of municipio, and comuna will be employed for the 
two administrative levels below the Provinces. Attempts to translate them would create 
confusion with the Anglophone meanings of municipality or commune, which are usually 
associated with locally elected local governments with legal personalities - precisely what the 
term autarquía will refer to (see below).  
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The Angolan state and local organs. Arrows indicate appointment authority 
 
It is law-decree no. 17/99 which today demarcates the roles and rules of local 
government. This law regulates the ‘deconcentrated’ services and functions of 
the central state, which ensures direct administration of the national territory 
by the central state. It makes no provision for autonomous local bodies. 
 
If law number 17/99 makes no fundamental break with the past, nor did, at 
least in theory, the Constitutional Revision of 1991-92, which effectively 
created the ‘2 nd Republic’ and ended one-party rule.13 Constitutional Law no. 
23/92 relates to the territorial administration. It states in Articles no. 145-7 
that there is room for the creation of locally autonomous government bodies - 
autarquías – which are to exist alongside the local organs of the state. Recall 
that the term ‘local organs of the state’ includes the Governor and the 
provincial administration. However, the law seems to leave open the question 
of whether the administrations of municipios and comunas will continue to 
exist alongside the new autarquias. The autarquias are to become legal 
personalities and their governing authorities would be elected locally. It is 
expected that the autarchic local governments will enjoy extensive budgetary 
autonomy and be permitted to collect taxes. Yet, as earlier stated, no such 
autarquías have been created and no detailed law has been issued to regulate 
them. 
 
                                                 
13 From a legal point of view, Angola does not have a Constitution proper, since that would 
entail a constitutional process led by a constitutional assembly, which was not the case with 
the revision of 1991. What is often referred to as the constitution is the Basic Law – Lei 
Fundamental.  The Constitutional Committee which is today revising the constitution as part 
of the new political primavera in Angola is composed of members of the National Assembly 
elected in the 1992 elections.  
President of the Republic 
Provinces (18) 
Governor 
Municipios (164) 
Administrator 
Comunas (557) 
Administrator 
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The basic tenets of the formal local government system, as delineated by law 
17/99, underline its highly centralised and hierarchical character:14 
 
PROVINCES: A provincial government is led by the Governor, who is directly 
nominated by the President of the Republic, and is, according to the 
constitutional law, ‘the Government’s representative in the Province, on whom 
it falls to direct the provincial governance, ensure normal functioning of the 
local administrative organs – and responsible for his activities to the 
Government and President of the Republic’.15  
 
MUNICIPIOS: The municipios are local state administrative bodies led by a 
Municipal Administrator, who is nominated by the Provincial Governor and 
who responds to the Governor. The municipal administrations are so stripped 
of formal powers that they cannot really be called a local government, making 
the term administration quite appropriate. The resources at their disposal stem 
from what is redistributed to them from the provincial governments. The 
Municipal Administrator is ‘the Government’s representative in the municipio , 
on whom it falls to direct the municipal governance, ensure normal 
functioning of the local administrative organs – and responsible for his 
activities to the Provincial Governor’.16 The most important functions of the 
municipal administrators are: 
 
· To provide regular inputs to the provincial governments’ preparation 
of the yearly plans for the municipio, and execute these. 
· To oversee ‘physical organisation’ and maintenance of basic public 
services. 
· To ensure local public security. 
· To ‘dynamise’ and ‘promote’ local public services (the terms dynamise 
and promote are used in Law 27/00, most likely since it is only the 
provincial administrations who have the actual resources to implement 
and run most public services). 
 
The bottom line is, says José Santana in MAT (Ministry of Territorial 
Administration): ‘The municipios have a lot of delegated responsibilities and 
competencies, but no resources’.17 
 
COMUNAS: The comunas are led by a Communal Administrator, who is 
nominated by the provincial governor (notably not by the municipal 
administrator), and is responsible for his activities to the municipal 
administrators. He has the right to a support staff, and some public service 
‘sections’ (say, sections for ‘urban services’ or ‘agricultural support’). The 
principal responsibilities relate to physical organisation and maintenance of 
basic public services: trash collection, road maintenance, parks, cemeteries and 
market places. Essentially, they are to ‘accompany and support’ the work and 
organisation of the village (or neighbourhood) of the comuna as well as the 
traditional authorities. In the state’s line structure, the Communal 
                                                 
14 The responsibilities of the local organs of the state are further outlined in Decree 27/00.  
15 Quoted from Constitutional Law no. 148 (author’s translations). 
16 See Article no. 33 of Law no. 17/99 (author’s translation). 
17 Interview with José Santana Director dos Assuntos Autárquicos, Sept 8, 2003. 
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Administrators are the direct superiors of the Traditional Authorities (a fact 
which hardly corresponds to the views on authority and prestige of many rural 
populations). The vagueness in some of the hyphenated terms above are, in the 
author’s view, reflections of the vagueness of the law itself. 
 
Below the level of comuna there are no formal state institutions organising the 
villages or the barrios in the cities and towns.18 For the comuna administrators 
to gain a foothold in these areas, they seem to need to be flexible in their 
relationships with their past allies among the sobas and sekulos and with the 
MPLA cadre from the 1st Republic – the Barrio Commissars and Residential 
Commissions.19  
 
STAFF: The provincial local government administrations are divided into 
delegations and directorates, and sub-divided into sections according to 
intricate regulations. On the municipal level, the administrations are divided 
into sections. A government study shows that these regulations are frequently 
not observed (MAPESS 2000:48). The same study also concludes that internal 
reorganisation is often used as a means of providing or increasing wages for 
privileged staff. On average, the study says, there are only three subordinates 
for each chefe (MAPESS 2000:16). Among the main conclusions in a study 
carried out by the Ministry of Territorial Administration is one that the local 
administration’s functional division - and consequently its staffing situation - 
is, almost as a rule, in disharmony with the priorities and work demanded by 
the situation on the ground (MAT 2002). This has led to a situation where 
there are sections and offices which are not staffed or staffed by people with 
irrelevant professional backgrounds and/or no resources to effect change. 
 
Human resources in provinces, municipios and comunas 
 
The distribution of human resources in the local organs of the state is heavily 
skewed in favour of the provinces (MAT 2002:24-29). Of all permanent staff: 
 
· 87.6 per cent work in the provincial administrations  
· 11 per cent work in the municipios 
· only 1 per cent work in the 557 comuna administrations 
· 97.7 per cent of all staff with higher education (categorised as 
‘technician’ or ‘higher technician’) work in the provincial 
administrations 
 
The staff distribution is also skewed in the sense that the qualified staff are 
                                                 
18 The government states the need for legislation to cover this level in its ‘Strategic Plan’ 
Conselho de Ministros, S. d. 2001. “Plano estratégico da desconcentração e descentralização 
administrativas: O poder local autárquico e o poder tradicional em Angola” – in particular in 
view of the need to solve some of the administrative problems of the major cities such as 
Luanda, which now have a great many comunas covering hundreds of thousands of people.  
19 It seems that in the cities and towns always held by MPLA there are still remnants of the 
detailed and hierarchical system of the bairro organisations set up by MPLA during the first 
few years of rule after independence. It is evident that their principal function was as 
‘transmission belts’ for MPLA policies. To the extent that these party people still act as state 
‘functionaries’, they do so without a legal basis. 
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heavily concentrated in a few provinces, in particular Luanda, Benguela and 
Huila, where the war has had less impact.  
 
The sectors which employ most staff are health, education and social 
reintegration (of soldiers and ‘returnees’). The provincial governments spend 
an average of 60 per cent of their income on salaries and subsidies to their 
employees – in some extreme cases up to 97 per cent – which leaves precious 
little for investment in social infrastructure. 
 
7.2 Two Municipios 
Katchiungo, Huambo:  
Travelling to the old Portuguese settlement town of Bela Vista, now renamed 
Katchiungo, east of Huambo city, means a long journey on a pot-holed and 
shattered asphalt road. It has now been cleared of mines – albeit not its 
surroundings – and is expected to deteriorate even further with increased 
traffic and the rainy season.20 Our team travelled to Katchiungo on 17 
September 2003 – the national holiday celebrating Agostinho Neto – and the 
official cadres were busy with party activities. 
 
As in the neighbouring towns, all official buildings, such as the offices of the 
municipio and comuna administrations, were decorated with MPLA banners, 
and their flagpoles bore the MPLA flag, with few if any national symbols such 
as the Angolan flag. We met the municipal administrator and his staff, all 
dressed up in brand new MPLA T-shirts and MPLA headwear. 
 
In our interview with the administrator he revealed that he had zero funds for 
development in his municipio, and hardly enough for the running costs of his 
office. This was evident from the office building – which was tidy, but had no 
computers, old colonial furniture and hardly anything bearing witness to 
much activity. The municipio of Katchiungo was heavily affected by the war, 
and was left isolated for long periods, and without a government presence. 
The local administration’s competence and capacities are still very weak. The 
administration is entirely dependent on the provincial administration for all 
development activities. It has few staff to carry out activities of its own. 
 
Having said all this, the challenges are formidable. The administrator said the 
municipio had just received 13,150 demobilised soldiers and 34,000 returnees. 
The only realistic possibility for them was to reintegrate into the agricultural 
population, since only two towns in Huambo are benefiting from the 
government’s vocational training programmes. There are virtually no 
industrial activities or other businesses in the area, except for petty trading 
related to agriculture. The administrator favoured micro-credit schemes, but 
added: ‘Really, if you don’t talk to people in the rural areas about hatchets, 
seeds and fertilizer, you might as well not bother.’ 
 
                                                 
20 Paradoxically, the roads in best condition in the Huambo province are those in the areas 
most affected by war, since little traffic destroyed the roads there. 
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Another big challenge is to provide schools for the children, since few schools 
are functioning at present. Currently, the provincial government is giving 
priority to the building of bridges in the area. Regarding the building of 
schools and health posts, the administrator looked to the NGO Development 
Workshop (DW) for assistance. He was happy that DW’s sanitation and water 
programme was moving ahead, but complained that there was no funding for 
its school construction programme. There are 198 villages in the municipio . 
There are plans to send out 250 teachers, but there are no schools as yet, 
although one has been planned.  
 
When we visited a village some distance from the municipio seat, the people 
revealed that there had been no development activities in the area since the 
war except for the World Food Programme’s distribution of some food, seeds 
and fertilizer. However, not all had benefited from this. In addition, 
Development Workshop had constructed a water pump and a well. Asked 
about which political parties were active in the area, a man exclaimed: “In this 
area there are only two parties, MPLA and DW!”  
 
Kilamba Kiaxi, Luanda:  
This municipio is situated in the musseque, or peri-urban ‘slums’ of Luanda. 
This part of the city was constructed in the makeshift way to be expected with 
the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants coming in 
successive waves during the last three decades (the most homogeneous group 
is people of the northern Bakongo group, who also spent many years in 
Zaire). Economically, the municipio is dominated by the petty trade and crafts 
of the urban population. Although quantitative data show that most people 
are extremely poor here, one cannot help but be struck by the way trade 
circulates a lot of money through changing hands. The streets are dirty and 
full of litter, and the area is virtually screaming for organisation to improve 
the livelihoods of people. Along with the money, overcrowded conditions and 
poverty comes violence, which apparently is very extensive, not least within 
the confines of the domestic units. 
 
 
Kilamba Kiaxi: Near a market place 
 
The municipio is barely equipped to deal with the enormous task of providing 
organised development to such a large population in such a small area. 
Currently, it has at its disposal: 3 tractors, one car for the administrator, 2 
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computers, one mini power generator, a large house and a few employees. 
Below the municipio administration there are three comuna administrations, 
where the situation is even more problematic. One local resident described 
their resource situation in the following way: ‘A typing machine from the 
1970s and little else’.  
 
The dominant governmental presence in Kilamba Kiaxi is the Luanda 
provincial government. However, informants clearly believed its efforts to be 
inadequate for developing their area. In fact, people referred to authoritarian 
methods such as the quite frequently violent expulsion of people from their 
shelters under the pretext that the occupants were squatters without legal title 
to the ground. 
 
In the absence of most local government services normally associated with the 
periphery of a city, foreign aid organisations and NGOs are now working in 
Kilamba Kiaxi to provide water, sanitary facilities, trash collection and more. 
One important actor, CARE and its LURE project, is trying to achieve local 
responsibility and sustainability by creating community groups and locally 
selected ‘Area Development Organisations’. These are to engage the 
authorities and the inefficient MPLA-based ‘neighbourhood commissions’ in 
concerted activity through high-profile ‘Development Forums’. In the absence 
of any support from the municipio government, which has no tax revenue or 
other means, the philosophy of CARE is to use cost-recovery as a means of 
achieving sustainability for development projects (CARE Angola 2003).21 The 
CARE project is working in a population where social trust is scarce, and 
establishing a collective good is difficult. The day before our visit, CARE had 
cleared a space at the marketplace for the construction of a crèche. A group of 
50 saleswomen had subsequently invaded the space, spread out their products 
for sale, and now refused to move. CARE threatened them with the police, 
and they aggressively heckled the CARE representative. 
7.3 Traditional Authorities between State and Rural 
Society 
Traditional authority in Angola is a no less controversial subject than in many 
other African democracies. However, the MPLA government seems to diverge 
in their dealings with the traditional authorities as compared with other 
regimes which draped themselves in the red banner after independence. After a 
period of initial vacillation, MPLA opted for a de facto ‘integrative’ approach 
to traditional authorities, as the need for improved organic links with the rural 
masses became a practical necessity shortly after independence. Traditional 
authorities are, somewhat imprecisely, commonly referred to as the sobas – 
the Mbundu word for a particular kind of chief. The MPLA state adopted 
more or less the same approach to the sobas as had the Portuguese colonial 
administration: they gave them formal appointments at the lowest 
administrative level of the territorial state administration, responsible for 
ensuring local popular cooperation with the decrees of the state. In addition, 
                                                 
21 One example of a cost-recovery based service was a marketplace latrine which was operated 
by two cleaners. They also collected the fees for latrine visitors: 5 kwanza for doing the 
‘minor’, and 15 for ‘majors’. 
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they would serve as the state’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the local level. Up until 
today, the MPLA government has employed approximately 33,000 sobas. 
They supposedly receive a small fee for their services.22 Our experience from a 
visit to two municipalities in the Huambo province is that the sobas still 
provide the municipal administrations with vital intelligence about the 
whereabouts and doings and dealings of the rural population in many vast and 
inaccessible areas.  
 
Roles and functions of sobas and other traditional authorities 
 
This list is not exhaustive, and its functions do not necessarily accrue to all 
sobas or other traditional authorities23: 
 
· Connect to the ancestors of the dominant lineages 
· Assume magical-religious recourse to specific agents for this 
purpose 
· Administer justice, with the ability to dispose of the lives of their 
subjects 
· Administer and distribute the land to subjects and strangers 
· Administer community issues related to dwellings, organisation of 
agricultural work, and barter 
· Control the population, statistically and security-wise 
· Establish social and juridical norms 
· Inform military forces about young men for recruitment 
· Reinforce and inspire construction and maintenance work 
· Watch over solidarity mechanisms 
· Handle conflicts 
· Negotiate on behalf of the communities with external agents 
(State, NGOs, private businesses, political parties etc.), including 
matters of natural resources  
· Transmit information to the population 
· Be spokespeople for the communities 
· Be points of connection between the community and the State 
 
 
The role of traditional authorities is such that they are still absolutely vital 
parts of rural community life. In most rural areas they are supposed to provide 
social cohesion, serve as upholders of a commonly accepted cosmology, and 
be points of reference for the negotiation of questions of justice. Thus, in the 
absence of a state with a solid local presence, the sobas mediate, record, and 
judge in many areas in which a modern state would want to regulate and 
                                                 
22 Figure from interview with MAT officials, António da Costa Lopes Faria and José Santana. 
A soba I met in the Katchiungo, Huambo, acknowledged his responsibilities and his regular 
reporting to the Municipal Administrator, but complained about the lack of payment for his 
services. 
23 The list is based upon the text in the MAT study ‘Macro-estrutura’ MAT. 2002. “Estudo 
sobre a macro-estrutura da Administração Local (contribuição para a desconcentração e 
descentralização) - documento de trabalho”. Luanda: Ministério da Administração do 
Território (MAT). Translated and abbreviated by the author. 
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legislate. In some places – in particular on the planalto and in the North-East – 
there are still remnants of virtual ‘kingdoms’ with a highly hierarchical system 
of authority (Marques Guedes, Feijó et al. 2003:186-8).24     
 
A continuing debate on traditional authority includes the question of how to 
identify both its institutions and individuals. If the traditional authority is to 
be recognised formally with specific rights and duties, who will decide who 
they are? How will their ‘jurisdictions’ be circumscribed? How can one ensure 
that the sobas who are presented with a formal status in the governance 
system are the ‘real’ ones?  
 
These are not only theoretical challenges. The question of identifying the ‘real’ 
sobas has led to local power struggles and quarrels at least since colonial 
times, and has continued since the post-independence state started to grant 
them quasi-formal recognition by employing them. 
 
In many localities, the local population would protect the ‘real’ sobas from the 
colonial state – which frequently castigated unruly sobas – by putting forward 
the name of someone who was not the ‘real’ leader, usually a junior member 
of the same lineage (see Pacheco 2002:4). This practice is likely to have 
continued after independence. 
 
The autocratic power25 of the traditional authorities – who merge several 
instances of power in one person – is not uncontroversial. Although the 
traditional authorities enjoy acceptance and respect, and still have the power 
of command among many local populations, their power will be increasingly 
contested. The process will accelerate as younger generations become 
educated, break with rural life and become susceptible to the ‘civil rights’ 
encoded in Angolan citizenship .26 
7.4 Demographic and Political Characteristics 
A brief note on the regional demographic and political characteristics is 
worthwhile at this point. Local government operates in widely different local 
conditions depending on the region. The major differentiator is that between 
the rural and the urban. But even for the rural administrations there is a 
significant difference between the sparsely populated and ‘remote’ South-East 
                                                 
24 In the município Chinjenje, Huambo province, Benjamin Soma claims to be the king of a 
large area which historically covered various municípios  and that he ‘controls’ 32 sobas and 
81 sekulos DW. 2003. “Uma viagem ao Município de Chinjenje”. Ondaka - Boletim mensal 
do projecto comunitário 'Vozes da Paz', Development Workshop, Huambo(27).. 
25 Autocratic power here refers to the traditional leaders’ hereditary authority, which invests in 
them several instances of power: legislative (normative), judicial and administrative. The term 
is not meant normatively or to imply that the traditional authorities’ ‘rule’ is inherently 
illegitimate or authoritarian. Many traditional leaders in Angola, as elsewhere in Africa, take 
great care in seeking consultation and consensus within their ‘constituencies’.  
26 Three typical scenarios of sobas confronting ’modernity’ are described by ADRA’s Fernando 
Pacheco Pacheco, F. (2002). Autoridades tradicionais e estruturas locais de poder em Angola: 
Aspectos essenciais a ter em conta na futura administração autárquica. Ciclo de palestras 
sobre descentralização e o quadro autárquico em Angola, Luanda, Friedriech Ebert Stiftung.: 
1) weakening and irrelevance 2) aggressive defence of the ‘traditional’ and lineage, and 3) 
‘modernisation’ as a modern community leader. 
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provinces and the densely populated central ‘Planalto’ highlands, the Luanda 
and Kwanza provinces and the Benguela and Namibe coastline.  
 
The urbanisation rate has continued to increase, but it is likely that its 
exponential growth will decline as the war has ended and rural areas are 
perceived as safer. The National Statistical Institute has estimated that 
whereas in 1996 about 42 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, this 
figure had risen to 60 per cent by 2001. This figure creates a skewed 
impression and needs to be adjusted for the immense weight of Luanda. The 
following figures say it all: in 1950, three per cent of Angola’s population 
lived in Luanda; in 1983 eleven per cent; and in 2000 23 per cent – with the 
population now having reached approximately 3.3 million (UNDP 2002:69-
71). Due to the city’s sheer size, and the fact that the urban social and 
economic infrastructure has not kept pace with the population influx, 
Luanda’s local government has to face the most challenging problems of urban 
development in the country.  
 
One should also take note of political differences. Except for the strength of 
FNLA and PRS in the North-East, the country is very bipolarised. The best 
indicator was the 1992 election results, where MPLA got a clear majority in 
the larger cities and the coastal provinces (Tvedten 1993:115). It received 85 
per cent of the vote given to the two main parties in its four main provinces, 
whereas UNITA received 76 percent of the vote in the central highlands 
(Tvedten 1997:58-9). It is difficult to assess what the subsequent ten years of 
war have done to the warring parties’ supporters. But there is still reason to 
believe that – if nothing else – tradition will ensure that certain areas will 
‘belong’ to given parties. To this it must be added that the skewed, youthful 
population structure means that traditions may mean less than they do to the 
older population.  
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8. Post-war Local Government 
8.1 How Power is Exercised Locally 
Territorial administration – a term frequently used to denote local government 
in Angola - is currently dominated by the growth of the power of the 
governors and their provincial administrations. As part of the stated efforts at 
‘deconcentrating’ state power, law 17/99 paved the way for an increase of the 
governors’ power at the expense of the ministries’. Previously, the line 
ministries were represented with their ‘commissars’ and delegations at the 
provincial level. The new law ensured the direct transfer of budgeted funds to 
the provincial administrations, which subsequently divided their resources 
between the newly established provincial directorates.27 The number of 
directorates is fixed at 11, each led by a director who is nominated by the 
Governor. However, not all line ministries’ functions are deconcentrated. The 
three ministries of Justice, Finance, and Interior (dealing with the police and 
security) are led by delegates who are nominated centrally. This guarantees the 
president and the central government a check on the governors in case they act 
too autonomously.  
 
However, the governors should still be seen as ‘the President’s men’, and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future. More than anything, it is the 
concentration of power in the hands of the governors and their close links 
with the Presidency which makes the Angolan system of government very 
centralised – despite recent talk about deconcentration.  
 
Most people interviewed for this study complained about the excessive power 
of the Governors, and that they frequently operate outside their juridical 
parameters. Rumours and accusations in the press about the governors’ or 
their administrations’ corrupt dealings are omnipresent. Some extreme voices 
claim that they practically run their administrations as private businesses, and 
terms such as ‘fiefdoms’ or ‘sultanates’ are often employed as analogies. One 
rumour has it that civil servants’ wages in some provinces arrive notoriously 
late because elements of certain provincial administrations use the wage 
transfers from Luanda to import products from neighbouring countries. 
Wages are only paid as profits from the sales as these are realised. It is 
assumed that key people in the provincial administrations in the north-eastern 
diamond provinces are operating in the diamond business, and that they do so 
in a way which blurs the borders between the public and the private.  
 
MPLA and UNITA agreed in the constitutional committee set up after April 
2002 that the governors shall not be up for election after the constitutional 
revision but be nominated by the President of the Republic, albeit emanating 
from the majority party in each province. No other parties are in a position to 
revoke this paragraph. Keeping in mind that the governors are not up for 
                                                 
27 Direcções is its Portuguese term. 
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election, a significant occurrence took place in the Malanje province where the 
President was forced to withdraw the governor in 2002 after popular 
opposition to his rule was vehemently expressed in popular rallies.  
 
Another central feature of the current local administration is that its apparatus 
is staffed by MPLA cadres at all levels, or people purporting to be so. When 
travelling through the country, one can frequently see the offices of municpios 
or comunas with MPLA slogans or banners nearby. This is not surprising 
given the fact that local governments in the one-party period of the ‘1 st 
Republic’, which lasted approximately until 1992, were automatically staffed 
by MPLA adherents. However, the current constitutional regulations have not 
done away with the party dominance of the local government and civil service 
in general in favour of professionalisation. As a general rule, the direct 
nomination system characterising recruitment eventually brings all threads 
back to the party elite (if not the Presidency) in Luanda. Will this 
concentration of power in MPLA-dominated local government administration 
be countered by recent power-sharing agreements between UNITA and 
MPLA? In principle it could, but most informants pointed out that UNITA’s 
three provincial governors were ‘following MPLA’s programme’ rather than 
presenting any alternative policies or modes of governance. Their autocratic 
behaviour has proved little different from MPLA’s governors. In some places, 
UNITA representatives are occupying the posts as administrators of 
municipios and comunas, recallable by the governors.28  
 
In Huambo city, informants pointed out that the UNITA Administrador 
Municipal was practically powerless in terms of effecting development 
projects. A visit to his offices confirmed that impression – a large building 
with little furniture, insufficient archives and a few computers. Several NGO 
representatives agreed that if somebody wanted support for a project or 
proposal, they would have to first inform the UNITA administrator. The real 
green light, however, would only come after seeking ‘facilitation’ with the 
MPLA vice-administrator. If the matter was of any importance, the vice-
administrator would facilitate access to the provincial level. This description 
of local authorities suggests that power still rests within MPLA.  
 
Quote from conversation with a Huambo intellectual:  
 
– The administrators don’t have any resources for development, 
hardly to run their offices. Even here in Huambo, the 
Administrator has to go to the provincial administration to retrieve 
money to buy paper for his office.  
– You’re exaggerating! 
– No, I am telling you: I am not exaggerating.  
 
                                                 
28 A parallel is what happened in Mozambique, which has an almost identical system and 
post-war situation. As a part of the peace agreement, the Renamo opposition received some 
‘district administrations’ (corresponding to Angola’s municipios). Yet their administrators 
were successively recalled by the governors of their respective provinces.  
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The lower echelons of the civil service, at municipio and comuna levels, are to 
an even greater degree staffed with people recruited for their loyalty to the 
MPLA government rather than for their professional merits.  
 
The issue of corruption in the Angolan civil service has been high on the 
agenda. However, this problem was not particularly emphasised by our 
informants. Rather, there was almost universal complaint about the lack of 
resources and trained cadres for development at local level. Insiders also 
emphasise the dysfunctionalities of excessive centralisation and bureaucracy. 
Should it be found that corruption is hampering the efficiency of the local 
administrations, then this is likely to be a consequence of systematic and 
systemic clientelism rather than purely individual and isolated searches for 
material gain. The MPLA state is a network of personalised loyalties, 
emanating from the President and down to comuna or even village levels.  
 
As a consequence of colonial negligence, decades of war, and the apparent 
prioritisation of loyalty (party and personal) over competence, the lack of 
educated staff to deal with development programmes and projects at local 
administrative level is a very serious constraint. The MAT is quite aware of 
the situation and refers to this as the principal impediment to improving 
public services and the capacity for development within the system under the 
MAT’s responsibility.29  
 
To what extent can the provinces deliver public services and development 
projects to the people? The discussion above indicates that outside the larger 
cities, the development capacity of the municipios and comunas is negligible, 
since they have no resources, little infrastructure and inadequate staffing. In 
addition, in the cities they are only likely to be able to implement works 
initiated and funded from a higher level. A change in this situation would 
require major changes in the present laws. At present, it is tempting to 
conclude that the main function of the administrations below the provinces is 
to provide the state with control and repression of its population. Local 
administrators often act in authoritarian ways, which appear to citizens to be 
arbitrary. In Luanda, informants referred to cases where the administrators 
were accomplices with the Province in tearing down dwellings for squatters 
without providing adequate alternatives. Other informants provided examples 
of administrators being involved in the harassment of competing political 
forces – be they other parties or oppositional sobas. In the absence of useful 
service delivery, such authoritarian behaviour will result in a loss of trust and 
further undermine the legitimacy of the state.  
 
Having said this, some local administrators are trying hard to make the best 
out of what little resources they have.  But the real development capacity is 
currently kept in other hands – the provincial administrations under the 
governors, and the Institutos Públicos under the (formal) tutelage of the line 
ministries.  
 
                                                 
29 MAT is running the Institute for Public Administration in Luanda, where administrators are 
given some training. 
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The public institutes provide resources for and carrying out vital public service 
or development functions, as their names indicate. There are institutes for 
forestry and agrarian development, employment and professional 
development, social security, socio-professional reintegration of ex-soldiers, 
highways, children and much more. Of the country’s total of 51 public 
institutes, 28 have delegations in the provinces; the rest are only in Luanda, 
but have hardly any presence at the municipio level or below. Curiously, they 
often appear to duplicate efforts at both central and provincial levels (MAT 
2002:20-24). Even though the public institutes are supposed to be ‘public 
persons with legal personalities and with administrative, financial and 
patrimonial autonomy’, it seems their resources are sometimes appropriated 
by the governors or the provincial administrations. As a MAT study (MAT 
2002:22) states:  
 
The institutional position of the public institutes has been heavily 
influenced by the confrontation which, case by case, has been  
established between its autonomy and its institutional relation to 
the deconcentrated organs (the Provincial Governments).30  
 
The MAT study concludes that the efficiency of the public institutes is better 
where their autonomy has not been jeopardised by the provincial 
administrations. In some places the Governors’ offices have entirely 
appropriated the public institutes’ resources and staff. These tendencies 
reinforce the centralisation of power and complicate inter-governmental 
relationships.31 It should be mentioned that although significant funds are 
channelled through the public institutes, their staffs are always subordinates 
and seldom wield heavy political influence.  
8.2 Bread and Butter Politics 
A corollary to democratic decentralisation is community based politics and 
popular participation in local governance. These are scarce goods in Angola, 
for many historical reasons. One cannot only blame colonialism. The major 
warring parties have to take their share of the blame. A constant situation of 
authoritarian politics for 30 years – and especially harsh periods of repression 
following events such as the 1977 uprisings of ‘Nito Alves’ in Luanda - was a 
strong disincentive for local independent leaders to organise around 
community politics.  
 
Today, the two major parties seem more interested in the struggle for central 
state offices, and hardly campaign ‘on the ground’ around bread and butter 
issues which are important to people. This may, of course, change with the 
approaching elections. With the absence of local elections however, it is not so 
surprising that few politicians feel it worthwhile to do much campaigning in 
the localities. Looking at the Parliamentarians as key politicians, it is clear 
                                                 
30 Author’s translation 
31 Conflicts over resources between the line ministries with tutelage over the institutos públicos 
and the provincial administrations have been reported, for instance, in MAT’s own study 
MAT. 2002. “Estudo sobre a macro-estrutura da Administração Local (contribuição para a 
desconcentração e descentralização) - documento de trabalho”. Luanda: Ministério da 
administração do território (MAT).. 
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they were all elected almost twelve years ago and were not obliged to respond 
to local constituencies; more than half – 130 out of 220 – were elected on the 
basis of national party lists, and the rest were elected with large provincial 
rather than local populations as constituencies. The UNDP even argues that 
the Parliamentarians’ sense of representativeness is less than during the time of 
the provincial assemblies in the period of the ‘popular republic’ (UNDP 
2002:84). 
 
There is now a political vacuum on several issues or conflict lines in the 
communities which the main political parties do not fill. Cases in point are 
gender, citizenship and human rights. In these areas the vacuum has been filled 
by NGOs such as Mãos Livres, SOS Habitat and Associação Justiça, Paz e 
Desenvolvimento. Elsewhere, issues of community development or complaints 
against the local authorities may sometimes be picked up and voiced by 
church organisations.  
 
As the new autarquias (to be treated in detail below) are created, a real test 
case will be Luanda. Will the provincial governor cede power to one mayor or 
autarchic assembly, or will they maintain the city’s current division into 
several municipios? Luanda city is the locality with the most resources, the 
most vibrant civil society, and a population quite capable of civic 
mobilisation. Luanda is a city where the introduction of local electoral politics 
could provide the impetus for civic engagement and a shake-up in the current 
two-party dominance. The current proliferation of NGOs and the media 
density has fertilised the ground for the growth of political challengers, whose 
base could be politics of protest or communitarian bread and butter issues.  
 
On the other hand, Luanda presents the greatest difficulties for future local 
governments. The makeshift character of the musseques, the virtual absence of 
urban planning, the characteristic lack of trust, social cohesion, solidarity or 
capacity for collective action in the immigrant population (Robson and Roque 
2002:88-92) have had profoundly disruptive consequences: the population is 
used to finding spontaneous, family-unit/individual and almost anarchic 
solutions to practical problems. One example of problems that cannot be 
solved is the notorious trash and sanitation problem. My visit to Kiliamba 
Kiaxi also provided examples of the difficulty of creating social infrastructure 
which could potentially improve people’s lives. Robson and Roque claim there 
are ‘few examples of successful voluntary, collective action on which to build’ 
(Robson and Roque 2002:92). If that is so, a major challenge for both 
development agencies and local government will be to find ways of convincing 
the millions in the musseques that cooperation and collective action is 
worthwhile and so mobilise a potentially untapped source of ‘social capital’.  
8.3 Reforms in the Pipeline – some Considerations 
1. As stated, no fundamental reform is foreseeable regarding the local 
governance system’s most powerful level, the provincial administrations.32 
                                                 
32 Except for MPLA, different parties had been proposing varying alternatives for the state and 
provincial reform. Notably, UNITA and the third largest party in Parliament wanted the 
country to be divided into six sections, in the form of a federal state. 
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However, what has been decided – in principle – is that in addition to the 
‘local organs of the state’ independent organs of ‘local power’ will be created 
in the form of autarquias.33 These autarquias will be ‘collective territorial legal 
persons which will pursue the interests of the population, thus having at their 
disposal elected representative organs and the right to manage their respective 
communities.’34 The autarquias will also have the right to collect and keep 
taxes. Other rights and duties are not as yet specified, but they will be under 
the tutelage of the provincial government (see Feijó 2002). 
 
2. The term autarquia brings out curious connotations, not only of autonomy, 
but also of ‘self-sufficiency’ and something outside the realm of the state. The 
influential juridical expert Carlos Feijo – a presidential adviser – has drawn up 
some thoughts on the character of the autarquias in Angola (UCA 2002: 232-
3).35 His portrayal of the autarquias is that of bodies that will be in opposition 
to the State. Mr. Feijo and officials in MAT36 refer to the autarquias alongside 
‘traditional power’ and ‘other civic organisations’ as the three instances of 
Local Power, insinuating that the autarquias are outside the state, and no 
more linked to the state than traditional authorities and civic organisations. 
Similarly, the government refers to the autarquias and traditional power as 
being separate and unconnected in its ‘Strategic plan for administrative 
deconcentration and decentralisation: local autarchic power and traditional 
power in Angola’ (Conselho de Ministros 2001). A worrying scenario which 
could result from this attitude is that the future autarquias will be stripped of 
the transfer of state funds. As they are in principle given the right to collect 
local taxes, the central state may decline its responsibilities for a number of 
public services.  
 
3. Although it has not yet been put into law, informants were expecting that 
autarquias would first be created within the territorial borders of some of the 
major cities’ municipalities. However, those who hope that everybody in 
Angola will have the opportunity to elect the leadership responsible for local 
development will need patience. Suggestions of creating the autarquias and 
holding local elections outside the bigger cities are usually dismissed with 
reference to the lack of ‘condições’. By this is meant that there are not 
sufficient infrastructure, economic potential or human resources to sustain a 
locally elected administration, again implying that the autarquias would have 
to ‘do by themselves’ and ‘nurture by sucking its own thumbs’.  
 
4. What has apparently not yet been decided is whether or not the existing 
administrations of the municipio and the comuna will continue to exist as the 
state’s ‘local organs’, in parallel with the elected bodies.37 There is a chance 
that there will be ‘double administration’ and disputes over resources, as has 
                                                 
33 The term is drawn from the Portuguese system and law. 
34 Authors’ translation of the text of the law. 
35 Some claim that Feijó is the most powerful driving force in the whole decentralisation 
process – perhaps even more than the Minister of Territorial Administration - since he is close 
to the President, and it is the Council of Ministers led by the President that eventually writes 
laws sent for ‘rubber stamping’ approval in Parliament. 
36 Interview with Jaime Pinto, Human Resources Director, MAT, September 8, 2003 
37 Interview with Jose Santana, Director dos Assuntos Autárquicos, MAT, September 8, 2003. 
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happened in many places in Mozambique where autarchic mayors and local 
assemblies have been introduced and now work alongside the old state 
administrative organs.   
 
5.  The key remaining question is: when will the first autarquias be created? At 
the time of writing (October 2003) the issue was enmeshed in the general 
debate over new election dates.38 Since it is the prerogative of the President to 
call new elections and MPLA enjoys a parliamentary majority, much will be 
decided within the confines of the party. UNITA’s Abel Chivukuvuku’s 
suggestion that local elections could be organised in 200739 might not be far 
off the mark. It should be noted that the timetable for the introduction of local 
elections and autarquias is not likely to be set by MAT with development 
considerations in view, but according to political negotiation between the two 
major parties. At the moment, none of  the key forces in the Presidency, 
MPLA, UNITA or MAT have taken the role as prime protagonist of the 
autarchisation process. 
 
6. All the parties, including leading figures in MAT, seem to accept the 
principle of gradualismo – gradualism. In this context it refers to the gradual 
process of introducing autarquias in the municipios judged to have ‘the 
necessary conditions’ (conditions referring to its resource base), leaving out 
other parts of the country until they are ‘mature’ enough, which may be 
difficult without resources from the central state institutions.  
 
7. The current political dialogue seems to favour ‘softening’ the centralising 
laws and administrative practices, so as to strengthen the manoeuvrability of 
local bodies of the state. As an example, law no. 80/99 ensures that some 
minor taxes can be collected and kept locally in provinces and municipios. 
However, people outside governmental or leading circles of the two main 
parties say that it is not the laws that are the problem, but the deeply 
embedded political and administrative culture of the elites, who are not 
interested in sharing power and authority.40 They argue that change will not 
come through laws, unless there is a major political shake-up in the current 
elite’s hold on power. 
8.4 Traditional Authorities and their Future Role 
In one way or another, the social fact of traditional authority (TA) must be 
recognised and respected by the state. Three key questions are debated today. 
Should the TA be formally recognised as part of the state’s governance 
system? If so, at what levels? In the state Parliament? In the state’s municipal 
and comuna administrations, and/or would they have a formal role in the 
autarquias? If in elected bodies, would they, as in some other African 
countries, be appointed or elected to reserved seats, or should there be 
elections for a ‘2nd chamber’?  
                                                 
38 A coalition of smaller political parties (not UNITA) signed a joint petition and held rallies in 
Luanda to put pressure on the President, whose prerogative it is to call fresh elections.  
39 Interview with Abel Chivukuvuku, senior UNITA politician, member of the Constitutional 
Committee, September 8, 2003.  
40 Examples were interviews with Araújo, Major, Pinto, and Nascimento.  
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The politicians do not seem to agree. There are people in MPLA defending the 
integration of traditional powers into national and local second chambers,41 
and some people within MAT are playing with the idea of confining the 
jurisdictions (territorially and functionally) of traditional authorities within a 
new ‘customary law’. Other influential figures are more cautious and 
ambivalent when it comes to the question of whether the TA’s jurisdiction 
over certain territories on the level of bairro and village should overlap with 
those of autarquias (Feijó 2002). The political opposition, on the other hand, 
seems unified in the view that TAs should be ‘liberated’ from the grip of 
MPLA.  
 
Hidden in the current public debate led by jurists are significant issues relating 
to reforms of the state which could eventually reduce or empower traditional 
authorities at the expense of democracy. If the state recognises the sobas’ right 
to represent or even administer, legislate, and judge in local matters, it will 
resuscitate a system of territorial administration reminiscent of that of the 
colonial power. If the state chooses not to grant such recognition, and instead 
tries to impose alternative authorities, many local populations may feel that 
their current beliefs and practices have been trampled upon. Neither scenario – 
‘re-africanisation’ or ‘abolition’ – seems a satisfactory way of dealing with the 
heritage of TAs and their role in the bifurcated state system. 
 
ADRA and Fernando Pacheco emphasise the need to facilitate the traditional 
authorities’ transition process from the realities of colonialism and war and 
into the realm of citizenship and modernity:   
 
I believe that we can make a peaceful and soft transition from the 
current situation to another in which the local [traditional] powers 
would reflect an adequate articulation between the democratic 
aspects and the cultural reality, and at the same time introduce […] 
democratising aspects in the exercise of traditional power, and still 
take advantage of everything of value in their institution. (Pacheco 
2002:12) 
 
In any case, questions about the integration of the ‘traditional’ within a 
modern democratic state are problematic, complex, and still unresolved. 
Several Angolan researchers at Universidade Católica are currently studying 
the future role of traditional authorities in a local governance system.  
 
Yet a word of caution seems in place. The current process could eventually 
lead to the recognition of traditional autocratic power by central power-
holders. These could, through laws and the administrative practice of 
provincial governors and administrators, come to turn certain sobas into 
pawns for local domination and reinforce undemocratic governance in rural 
areas where populations have been refused the right to elect their own 
leadership. The concern is not so much what will happen in cities which will 
                                                 
41 Moises Gaspar Kamabaya, Deputado MPLA, Vice-presidente da quarta commissão, Sept 8, 
2003. 
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‘gradually’ be turned into autarquias, but what will happen in the towns and 
rural areas which will not. The overriding issue is how to improve conditions 
in the rural areas and their regional cities. Rural and regional discontent is a 
dormant danger in Angola. As in other oil-rich countries, regional groups 
might feel sidelined or underprivileged and mobilise political action along 
ethnic or regionalist lines, a process which is encouraged if the national polity 
emphasises and reinforces the role of ‘tradition’ and the ‘customary’.  
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9. Development Interventions 
9.1 Development NGOs Relating to Local Governments 
At least three non-governmental organisations – one national (ADRA42), one 
semi-Angolan (Development Workshop - DW) and one international (CARE) 
– are in different ways trying to relate to the issue of local governance by 
establishing local development forums. Such forums are often referred to as 
forums for social consensus in which all stakeholders in a local community 
participate, including the local administrations. These organisations all seem 
interested in creating a sort of ‘pilot’ or ‘pre-assembly’ to what would 
eventually be locally elected assemblies in the autarquias. They all report 
relatively positive experiences with these pilot forums. In some cases, forums 
are preceded by participatory groups or the creation of local associations. 
ADRA and DW in particular as a rule work through the creation of 
responsibility/co-ordination groups or by creating local associations – for the 
administration of a water pump, a school, a women’s association, an 
agricultural group or other initiatives. Staff in both NGOs argue that in the 
rural areas the associations must work in collaboration with both the local 
municipio or comuna administrator and the traditional authorities to have a 
chance of success. Failure to gain the confidence of either might result in lack 
of cooperation or outright obstruction.  
 
 
A community administered water pump in Caala, Huambo, 
organised by Development Workshop 
 
We found the advantage of ADRA and DW to be their innovative approaches 
towards creating social infrastructure through popular participation. This was 
observed in the rural areas, where the work input from locals ensured school 
construction or agricultural co-ordination for a fraction of the cost of, for 
instance, FAS. The projects of CARE in the peri-urban Kilamba Kiaxi 
necessitate, perhaps, a different approach. Some of their projects, following 
their stated philosophy, depend on user fees for their social infrastructure 
provision. In the rural areas user fees are not necessary – is it so in the towns? 
                                                 
42 ADRA is the acronym for Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente – Action for 
rural and environmental development.  
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Devolution of power to decentralised local government will raise the question 
of user fees and ‘cost recovery’ approaches, approaches which have recently 
proved to have, at best, mixed results in Africa. In relating to this issue, 
learning from the Angolan NGOs seems pertinent, rather than simply basing 
the approach on a priori solutions inspired by ‘New Public Management’ 
thinking.  
 
In the Huambo area DW and ADRA have varying experiences with regard to 
co-operation with local authorities, from facilitation to inattention and non-
cooperation. Sometimes there was a mix of these depending on which level of 
local administration they were relating to. The international NGO 
CONCERN has learned from its experiences that in order to achieve 
sustainable health and nutrition projects, it has to relate to the provincial level, 
the only government level with any resources to provide permanent staffing. 
But it has experienced enduring difficulties in gaining the provincial 
administration’s dedication and commitment.  Relating to any lower level of 
state organs was pointless. NGOs like ADRA, DW and some others have 
educated staff and financial resources which by far exceed those of 
cooperating municipios. 
9.2 Governmental Organisations and the International 
Community 
In the absence of the creation of autarquias, the government and the 
international community have started two major initiatives for support and 
development at the municipal level. One is the Fundo de Apoio Social (FAS), 
which is formally a Public Institute but primarily funded by the World Bank 
and other donors. FAS is the government programme with the most 
substantial impact on the construction of schools, health clinics, and other 
social infrastructure in many provinces. The recently initiated FAS III 
programme aims to build administrative and planning capacity in about 18 
chosen municipal administrations. The planning is meant to include local 
participation through a Consultative Forum and by employing a Community 
Driven Development (CDD) approach.43 Perhaps a little self-defeating, the first 
point on the chosen municipios’ activity list for the FAS programme for 
municipio  development is ‘training in CDD’.44 At present, FAS’ coordination 
with MAT seems limited. It is our prediction that FAS will be a major 
provider of social infrastructure. Its contribution to political and democratic 
decentralisation, however, will remain fairly modest.  
 
Whereas FAS seems to be under the strong influence of the World Bank, the 
European Union is supporting local government development through its 
Programa de Apoio à Reconstrução (PAR). It is essentially a programme for 
the studying of how to reconstruct municipalities, their administrations and 
vital social infrastructure. When a reconstruction plan is ready, it will be 
‘auctioned off’ to development funders and contractors. Its leader, Walter 
                                                 
43 The term is now fashionable in certain WB sections. 
44 Critical voices claim that FAS is a pet MPLA project, and that it is driven according to the 
dictates of political patronage.  
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Viegas, expressed less interest in issues of democracy, as long as people ‘get 
their roads, bridges and hews to till the earth’.  
 
Finally, UNDP’s approach seems by far the most interesting when it comes to 
moving the political forces in Luanda. Alfredo Teixeira of UNDP suggests45 a 
gradual transfer of duties and responsibilities – along with resources – to pilot 
municipios. The pilots would be drawn from municipios of various categories, 
from cities to more rural ones without ‘condições’. These would then function 
almost as autarquias, although without having an elected leadership. The 
project would entail transferring funds and competence so that the 
administrations at municipio and comuna levels could take responsibility for 
the following: trash collection, cemeteries, water and electricity distribution, 
urban transport, health clinics, primary schools, licensing of commercial 
activities, real estate concessions, urban planning, management of nationalised 
real estate, street maintenance, management of forests and beaches, 
construction of sports facilities and student residences. Teixeira emphasised 
that this deconcentration could take place now and without the holding of 
elections but that one would have to find ways to set up ‘Development 
Forums’ to inspire popular participation. It is clear that, if realised, the UNDP 
plans would involve relocation of management capacities from the provincial 
to lower levels and would bring about significant changes as compared to 
today’s service provision. In addition, it would take some of the power base 
away from the governors.  
9.3 Dilemmas Facing Funders of Local Government 
Reform 
When asking people in MAT or people close to MPLA what the international 
community could contribute in order to support the development capacity of 
local government in Angola, the answer was clear: training.46 There was also a 
tendency for people not close to the MPLA state to emphasise the support of 
civil society through the media, NGOs, free debate and so on. The latter group 
expressed considerable hesitation about the desirability of supporting the local 
organs of the state (the MAT system), which many saw as viciados – 
‘corrupted/monopolised’ – by MPLA.  
 
When first looking at the highly centralised government’s lower level 
administrations, with their extremely weak ability to provide public services 
and democratic governance, providing institutional support seems a good idea. 
There is a lack of training, staffing, infrastructure and resources, so these are 
obvious places where some financial input could make a difference. MAT 
itself appeals for formação – staff training. Doing so, however, would 
inevitably entail supporting and training the MPLA state cadre.  
 
Would supporters of democratic decentralisation really solidify structures of 
one-party rule with a history of power monopolisation even as substantial 
reforms of deconcentration and democratic decentralisation keep being 
                                                 
45 UNDP plan described by Alfredo Teixeira, Senior expert on governance, UNDP, interviewed 
September 19, 2003. 
46 Interviews with Faria, Santana and Jaime Pinto. 
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delayed or indefinitely postponed in the name of ‘gradualism’? This question 
must be followed by pondering on the substantial uncertainty regarding the 
future of many municipio administrations. Would it be wise to train a 
municipal administration cadre which might well be – or should be – replaced 
with autarquia institutions and elected officials?  
 
If one believes that political development is such that the territorial 
administration will gradually transform itself into a less party-based civil 
service, then both dilemmas can be answered in the affirmative. And if some 
municipio and comuna officials’ posts  disappear, their staff could function in 
the running of the autarquias’ business and management. Luís Araújo of SoS 
Habitat was the most outspoken opponent of that thesis. He argued that any 
institutional support uncritically channelled to the local organs of the state 
would cement MPLA in the state apparatus ‘for the next fifty years’.47 
 
Another major difficulty with supporting the planned local government 
reforms is that no significant changes in the power of the provincial 
governments are envisaged. Is it really wise to support reforms at lower levels 
when all resources seem to be channelled through the provincial 
administration, and the notoriously corrupt and unaccountable governors? 
Lindo Tito of PRS48 claimed that the governors would jeopardise the 
autarquias over which they will have tutelage authority. His opinion is similar 
to that of Abel Chivukuvuku of UNITA:  
 
“The country needs reforms from above. The challenges of the 
country cannot be resolved from bottom up, there must be reforms 
in the state: from top-down. Introducing autarquias is all very well, 
but it alone cannot solve the country’s problems.” 
 
Apart from many diverging points of emphasis, most non-MPLA informants 
expressed distrust in MPLA and believed that they would not loosen or 
renounce their power over the state apparatus and territorial administration. 
Opposition politicians see the way MPLA uses the governors as key nodes in 
their system of local power. As long as they are there, MPLA will monopolise 
power. The logic of this kind of opposition politics is to try to gain political 
power at national level in order to rearrange the state and its staff, a thinking 
which has in other countries (such as Mozambique) led the opposition to 
ignore local politics in favour of the national.  
 
As an alternative to supporting a politicised system of local governance, the 
international donor community could channel funds for local government 
through independent agencies. The multilateral system is already doing that, 
co-ordinated by UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (OCHA). The government is also doing the same through its system 
of Public Institutes and Public Funds, which only partially co-ordinate its 
activities with the provincial administrations. The idea of circumventing a 
local government system with very low capacity might seem attractive. An 
                                                 
47 Interview with Luis Araújo, Coordenador da Direcção, SOS Habitat, September 11, 2003. 
48 Deputado PRS, membro da Commissão Constitucional, interviewed September 9, 2003. 
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obvious counter-argument is that such an approach would do little to 
strengthen this system, which is obviously a necessity for future sustainability. 
The International Crisis Group proposes a combined solution (ICG 2003:9):  
 
In order to gather some momentum and make its actions more 
transparent and inclusive, the government could consider 
establishing an independent development corporation49 tasked to 
deliver services and administer areas at the provincial and 
municipal levels. Such a corporation could organize pilot projects 
in service delivery and skills development for provincial and 
municipal government officials, support the placement of qualified 
technical personnel in municipal offices, help determine competitive 
salary structures, and focus on attracting the Angolan diaspora 
back to increase its professional cadre. 
 
The idea of creating such a corporation would be more attractive were it not 
for the fact that Angola already has 51 public institutes in addition to the 
Public Funds. Most of them are dedicated to countrywide development and 
are supposed to work in co-ordination with provincial and municipal organs, 
yet there are, as previously argued, notorious difficulties regarding this co-
ordination. The odds that another public institute (or ‘corporation’) would 
make a difference are thus low.  
8.4 The Mozambique Case – some Parallels and 
Lessons  
As Angola sets out to decentralise the political system, the question should be 
asked whether there is anything to learn from Mozambique’s decentralisation 
process. At first glance, there is a series of historical parallels between the two 
countries.50 First and foremost, the two radical movements which took power 
in 1974-75 – Frelimo in Mozambique – are still in power. The similarities 
extend to the system of local governance. 
 
Frelimo installed a highly centralised state administration51 and endeavoured 
to run the country as a state directed and planned economy. There was little 
difference between the political and the administrative/bureaucratic power-
holders in the provinces, districts and villages. The State and the Party was, 
and is, difficult to distinguish in many administrations and institutions. 
                                                 
49 Emphasis added. 
50 Both were former Portuguese colonies, both became independent in 1975 after more than 
ten years of fierce guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese, and in both countries the leading 
guerrilla movements assumed state power. They soon transformed themselves into ‘vanguard 
parties’, which claimed the right to function as the only legal party. They did their utmost to 
exclude other political forces from power. In both countries war broke out again almost 
immediately after independence. In addition to massive external interference, there was a 
domestic element in the wars. The military opposition was dominated by discontented 
regional/ethnic elites. 
51 It must be noted that this centralism was not only due to their ‘communist ideology’ but 
also due to traditions inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration, and its failure to 
build any kind of locally run administrative system, with the exception of a few urban 
municipalities in which Africans had a negligible formal role. 
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As in Angola in the 1990s, regional power in Mozambique has been ever more 
concentrated in the person of the provincial governor, directly nominated by 
the President. Under the provinces, the next administrative level is the 
‘district’, more or less corresponding to Angola’s municipios. These were 
headed by the District Administrator, appointed by the provincial governor. 
The administrators are often local strongmen, and were frequent targets of the 
guerrillas of Renamo during the war.  
 
It is worth mentioning one major difference in the way Frelimo sought to 
exercise local power, as compared to MPLA and the Angolan state. Frelimo 
launched fierce attacks against the ‘traditional authorities’ (the regulos) after 
independence under the slogan: ‘Down with obscurantism’. Enlightenment 
was the order of the day, and to achieve social change the magico-religious 
influence of the regulos would have to be broken. MPLA in Angola took a 
more pragmatic stance, and ‘integrated’ rather than ‘alienated’ the traditional 
authorities.  
 
Mozambique has had the chance to rebuild a civil territorial administration 
throughout the country since 1992, and introduced the first autarquias with 
locally elected governments in 1998. Since the main opposition party Renamo 
boycotted the process, Frelimo won power in all the autarquias. Angola can 
learn from the Mozambican experience with decentralisation since its judicial 
framework shares the same Portuguese background, and since the Angolan 
law-makers admit to drawing inspiration from Mozambique.52 When it comes 
to autarquisation of some cities and towns, Mozambique is now at least six 
years ahead of Angola. 
 
Eventually, in 1996, the government and Parliament of Mozambique decided 
that democratic decentralisation would be limited to the conversion of 33 city 
and town administrations into autarquias – and would not include elections of 
governors or district administrators. The concept of autarquías was 
introduced to signify the institutions in the cities to which power and 
authority was devolved.  
 
The second local elections for Mozambique’s autarquias in November 2003 
and the first five years’ experience of autarchic local governance could bring 
home many lessons. Even now, some points seem relevant for Angola.  
 
· The legacy of the bifurcated state has not been overcome. The rural 
areas and their districts are still under direct state rule. Consequently, 
almost two-thirds of the population have been prevented from having 
local elections. For how long can this situation persist without 
engendering political discontent and instability? 
· Five years after the first 33 municipalities were created there is no 
timetable for the introduction of more. Hence, the promise to introduce 
local elections ‘gradually’ where ‘conditions’ are ripe could turn into a 
                                                 
52 Interview with Jaime Pinto, Human Resources Director, Ministerio da Administração do 
Território, Sept 8, 2003. 
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smokescreen for central rule of rural areas and their populations for the 
foreseeable future. For instance, it means that natural resources in more 
than 90 per cent of the national territory remain within the jurisdiction 
of the (still) party-based state administration.    
· In the year 2000 political violence in Mozambique was centred on 
regional politics. Renamo demanded power sharing at the provincial 
level. Did MPLA learn the lesson when granting UNITA the right to 
have governors in their ‘majority provinces’?  
· The unelected governors are still far more powerful than locally elected 
officials. Among other consequences, there are indications that the 
provincial governors have remained the locus of attention for 
development funders even after the introduction of autarquias. Politics 
in Mozambique still seem to revolve around central state power, to the 
prejudice of local politics and ‘bread and butter’ issues. 
· In relation to the concept of autarquía - an inheritance from the 
Portuguese system – there are some drawbacks. Although solid 
conclusions are premature, there are indications that the creation of 
these local autarchic bodies means that the state declines responsibility 
for many public services and fails to transfer the funds necessary to 
create effective local development and service provision.  In 
Mozambique, many autarquias run the risk of becoming very 
unattractive bodies to govern, with little chance of accumulating 
sufficient resources to make a significant development impact. 
Consequently there will be little political gain for its officials. Donors 
supported (massively) the holding of local elections, but had, at least up 
until the elections, failed to provide support for the very government 
institutions to which officials were to be elected. 
· The local elections in 1998 appeared to be little other than dress 
rehearsals for the Renamo opposition in preparation for the real thing – 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1999. This pattern 
appears to be repeating itself before the 2003 local elections and 2004 
national elections.   
 
Further points to study after the Mozambican elections in November 2003: 
· Did the institutional set-up (almost identical to that foreseen in Angola) 
increase popular participation in local governance? 
· Did local elections contribute to support for democratic ideas and 
electoral politics in general? 
· Did ‘autarchisation’ contribute to more development-oriented local 
governments which were more accountable and responsive to the local 
populations?53 
· Is the continuing domination of provincial governors over locally 
elected officials jeopardising the efficiency of autarquias and popular 
participation and trust in the elected institutions? 
 
                                                 
53 The author has previously done extensive research on local government and reforms in 
Mozambique Orre, A. 2001. “Local government reform in Mozambique - does it matter?” 
Department of Comparative Politics. Bergen: University of Bergen., and will participate in a 
follow-up study led by Einar Braathen (NIBR) in late 2003. The follow-up has been funded by 
NORAD and aims to gauge the experiences of 10 out of the 33 autarquias.   
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10. Afterthoughts 
The framework is not promising so far for the creation of real democratic 
decentralisation, for the following reasons:  
 
· First and foremost, there is no ‘master plan’ with a timetable for 
devolution of power and the creation of democratic local governance in 
the entire national territory. In one way, the ‘horse is being put before 
the cart’, since radical decisions are now being taken (at least officially) 
in the current Constitutional Commission by politicians who were 
elected eleven years ago.  
· Almost in competition with an agenda for real local development and 
reconstruction, power devolution and pro-poor local empowerment, 
the current deconcentration and decentralisation process seems to be 
driven by a) MPLA’s (or forces within) interests in maintaining and 
expanding centralised control over the country’s territory and b) the 
political compromising between MPLA and UNITA (which focuses on 
power-sharing) and c) the tendency for ad hoc solutions when creating 
more localised service provision. 
· The adopted model of creating autarquias is too locked into the 
Portuguese legal and political framework. Few alternative or innovative 
models seem to have been considered.  
· Suggested laws and the setting up of decentralised local government 
bodies fail to deal with problems related to the historical legacy of the 
bifurcated state; that is, the lack of integration of the rural and the 
urban in a national framework for citizenship and democracy. The 
‘gradualism’ of the process implies that only selected cities will be given 
self-government in autarquias within the foreseeable future. The rural 
population will be left without such institutions. Instead, if the role of 
the traditional authorities is indeed formalised as suggested by the 
government, its revamping could mean not only ‘respect’ for rural 
populations and their local customs, but also disrespect for their 
attempts to emancipate themselves as citizens. Traditional leaders will 
be confined to a role where, like Don Quixote, they are defending 
tradition against the forces of modernity.   
· There is a failure to integrate decentralisation plans with a global 
government agenda for pro-poor policies and empowerment. The 
gradualism of the autarquias – focusing on the need for a priori 
capacity - raises the question of whether the government will give 
priority to the transfer of human and financial resources for the newly 
elected local institutions to be actual ‘organs for development’.  
· Administrative culture at local levels, from province to comuna, is still 
excessively centralist, authoritarian and clientelistic. The suggested 
reforms fail to mention – far less attack – these factors, which limit 
their democratic accountability.  
· Provincial leadership will not be up for election. The deconcentration 
process has strengthened the provincial administrations at the expense 
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of the line ministries. The reform could possibly be justified with 
reference to improved service delivery, but it has transferred power and 
authority from a body (the national government) which in principle is 
removable through elections, to one which is not. Little is said and 
done to deal with the excessive resource concentration and 
management powers at the provincial level – a resource concentration 
which works to the direct detriment of dispersal to lower levels of the 
state administration. 
 
Given these unpromising prospects, how can Norwegian development 
organisations support local government and its role in popular participation 
and service delivery? Should international development organisations 
contribute to the current process of ‘deconcentration and decentralisation’, 
and support government efforts to improve existing institutions under MAT’s 
tutelage, the local organs of the state?  
 
The answer will depend on whether aid organisations are seen as most 
effectively pressurising the government from within or from without – by 
contributing to the process and formulating aid conditionalities, or by being 
external critics. Outsiders are, in any event, likely to have a limited impact 
when it comes to the restructuring of the state that eventual autarchisation 
involves. 
 
Should the choice be to stay outside the process, the risk is that local 
development projects might appear to be working in isolation or in 
duplication of government efforts. It would leave the aid organisations 
vulnerable to the charge that they are failing to develop sustainable domestic 
capacity. One recommendation that seems fairly safe was made by Sabine 
Fandrych of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: to create a donor working group on 
decentralisation and work out joint policies there. The efforts by the World 
Bank, EU and UNDP now appear to be partly overlapping and uncoordinated. 
In any case, supporters of democratic decentralisation will need to consider 
and discuss the questions and dilemmas raised in the previous section. 
 
Since donors hesitate to intervene in politically controversial matters, 
supporting institutions led by able technocrats is the ‘easy way out’. In the 
eagerness to support old and new institutions – or ‘corporations’ – one should 
not lose sight of the need for introducing elections as a paramount check on 
the politicians and bureaucrats. As Crook & Manor (Crook and Manor 
1998:299) conclude in their seminal work on democracy and decentralisation, 
elections ‘do form an irreplaceable element in any system of public 
accountability. It is, therefore, an obvious requirement that whatever the 
system of representation, elections should be regular and fair if they are to 
function effectively.’  
 
Encouraging democratic decentralisation is not only about ‘how to generate 
local development, and improved public services’. The country’s territorial 
governance is also one of the major determinants of the future development of 
a democratic state, its stability and peace. Flickers of instability in 
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Mozambique on the issue of how to reform the state ‘from the top down’ are 
warnings that local politics could lose out in the battle for state power.  
 
Organising local elections in Angola will make little sense if the new 
institutions with locally elected representation are seen as unattractive both by 
potential officials/politicians and the autarchic populations themselves. Locally 
elected governments should be embedded in local society and equipped with 
sufficient institutional capacity and resources to make a development impact. 
The new institutions should also be attractive for opposition politicians. It 
must be guaranteed to potential office holders that other parts of the state 
machinery are supportive of local initiatives, even if they come from 
independents or politicians of parties other than the state incumbent. One 
challenge for the international community and others supporting democratic 
decentralisation is to enable the establishment of this kind of environment.  
 
Our priority would be that donors and the international community put their 
emphasis on the virtues of democracy, including local democracy, when 
relating to Angola. Deconcentration and decentralisation have too often, 
including in Europe, been fig-leaves for actual centralisation processes, or, 
equally unfortunately, the means for the state to acquit itself of responsibility 
for local development – except, of course, when it comes to public security or 
extractive interests. Angolans have never had a chance to elect local 
administrations responsible for local development. However rural, 
uneducated, understaffed or ‘unconditioned’ the people and local 
administrations might be, they do deserve a chance to experience the dynamics 
of holding local politicians accountable through elections, an experience which 
Lisbon and Luanda power-holders have for too long denied them.  
 
 
 
 
 
Huambo 
C M I 
 70 
Bibliography Part II 
CARE Angola. 2003. “Country and project profile”. Luanda. 
Conselho de Ministros, S. d. 2001. “Plano estratégico da desconcentração e 
descentralização administrativas: O poder local autárquico e o poder 
tradicional em Angola”. Luanda. 
Crook, R. and J. Manor. 1998. Democracy and decentralisation in South Asia 
and West Africa - Participation, accountability and performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
DW. 2003. “Uma viagem ao Município de Chinjenje”. Ondaka - Boletim 
mensal do projecto comunitário 'Vozes da Paz', Development 
Workshop, Huambo(27). 
Eriksen, S. S., J. Naustdalslid and A. Schou. 1999. Decentralisation from 
above - a study of local government in Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe. Oslo: NIBR. 
Feijó, C. 2002. “O poder local em Angola”. In: UCA Universidade Católica de 
Angola - Faculdade de Direito, Ed. A constitução angolana - temas e 
debates. Luanda: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and National Democratic 
Institute, pp. 
Feijó, C. 2002. “A tutela administrativa sobre as autarquias locais em 
Angola”. In: (PNUD) UNDP, Ed. A descentralização em Angola. 
Luanda: UNDP, (PNUD), pp. 
ICG, I. C. G. 2003. “Angola's choice: Reform or regress”. Luanda/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group. 
Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and subject. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
MAPESS. 2000. “Estudo sobre a macro-estrutura da administração pública 
angolana - uma abordagem preliminar”. Luanda: Ministério da 
administração pública, emprego e segurança social (MAPESS). 
Marques Guedes, A., et al. 2003. Pluralismo e Legitimacão - A edificacão pós-
colonial de Angola. Coimbra: Livraria Alemedina. 
MAT. 2002. “Estudo sobre a macro-estrutura da Administração Local 
(contribuição para a desconcentração e descentralização) - documento 
de trabalho”. Luanda: Ministério da administração do território 
(MAT). 
Orre, A. 2001. “Local government reform in Mozambique - does it matter?”. 
Department of Comparative Politics. Bergen: University of Bergen. 
Pacheco, F. 2002. Autoridades tradicionais e estruturas locais de poder em 
Angola: Aspectos essenciais a ter em conta na futura administração 
autárquica. Ciclo de palestras sobre descentralização e o quadro 
autárquico em Angola, Luanda, Friedriech Ebert Stiftung. 
Robson, P. and S. Roque. 2002. “In search of community and collective action 
in Angola”. In: Malyn Newitt, Patrick Chabal and Norrie Macqueen, 
Eds. Community and the state in Lusophone Africa. London: 
Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies, Kings College, pp. 
Tvedten, I. 1993. “The Angolan debacle”. Journal of Democracy, 4(2). 
Tvedten, I. 1997. Angola - struggle for peace and reconstruction. Oxford: 
Westview Press. 
C M I 
 71 
UCA, U. C. d. A.-F. d. D., Ed. 2002. A constituçião Angolana - temas e 
debates. Luanda: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and National Democratic 
Institute. 
UNDP, P. 2002. “Angola - os desafios pós-guerra”. Luanda: Sistema das 
Nações Unidas em Angola. 
 
C M I 
 72 
List of Interviews Part II 
 
Name Organisation/ Position Interview date 
Abel Chivukuvuku UNITA, Comissäo Constitucional Sept 8 
Administrador Municipal  AM de Cachiungo, Huambo Sept 17 
Alan Cain Director, Development Workshop Sept 11 
Alfredo Teixeira Senior expert on governance, UNDP - Luanda Sept 19 
Alida Gunvor Endresen Norwegian Embassy Sept 7 
António da Costa Lopes 
Faria 
Director Nacional da Administração Local, MAT Sept 10 
Antonio Katingo Administrador Municipal de Cachiungo Sept 16 
Armando Marques Guedes Professor da Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, former diplomat in 
Angola 
Sept 22 
Arne Øygard Norsk Folkehjelp (Ajuda Popular de Noruega), 
Resident Representative  
Sept 10 
Beat Weber DW Huambo – Research and peacebuilding 
advisor 
Sept 16 & 17 
Carlos Figueiredo Development Workshop, Researcher  Sept 19 
Concern Health worker Huambo Sept 17 
Concern Nutrition worker Huambo Sept 17 
Cupi Baptista DW Huambo Representante Sept 16 & 17 
Dinho Major CID – ADRA - Luanda Sept 11 
Douglas Steinberg CARE - Angola, Country Director Sept 8 
Fernando Macedo Presidente, Associação Justinça, Paz e 
Democracia (AJPD) 
Sept 9 
Franz-Wilhelm Heimer Researcher, Centro de Estudos Africanos Sept 5 
Helder Marcelino ADRA Huambo Sept 18 
Jaime Pinto Human Resources Director, MAT Sept 8 
Jonathan Howard DW Huambo – Architect Sept 16 
José Santana  Director dos Assuntos Autárquicos, MAT Sept 8 
Lindo Tito Deputado PRS, membro da Commissão 
Constitucional 
Sept 9 
Luís Araújo Coordenador da Direcção, SOS Habitat  Sept 11 
Luís Nascimento FPD – Frente Para a Democracia e Advogado Sept 15 
Moises Gaspar Kamabaya Deputado MPLA, Vice-presidente da quarta 
commissão 
Sept 8 
Natalia N. Isaac Coordenadora Governação e Reforço 
Institucional, CARE Angola (Kilamba Kiaxi 
LURE Project) 
12 sept. 
Nelson Pestana Researcher, Centro de Estudos Africanos Sept 5 
Raúl Araújo Reitor da Univ. Lusiada Sept 9 
Sabine Charlotte Fandrych Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Representante Residente Sept 9 
Vicente Inglês Pinto Ordem dos Advogados, Vice-Presidente, 
Coordenador da Commissão dos Direitos 
Humanos e Acesso à Justiça 
Sept 12 
Victor Hugo Director, Fundo de Apoio Social Sept 10 
Walter Viegas  Resident rep. Comunidade Europeia Sept 15 
Xavier João Abrantes Dir do Gabinete do vice-governador para a área 
de economia e produção, Província de Huambo 
Sept 18 
Laurence C. Clarke Resident Representative, Country Office Luanda, 
The World Bank 
Sept 10 
Bernard Ouandji Economic Advisor, UNDP Sept 10 
Pedro Luís da Fonseca Director, Ministry of Planning Sept 12 
Dalmacio Benicio Ministry of Planning Sept 11 
Martin Johnston Country Representative for Angola Sept 10 
C M I 
 73 
Recent Literature on Angola (2000-2003) 
ACTSA (2001). Angola Peace Monitor. Johannesburg: Action fo r Southern Africa. 
Adauta, Mário and Kenneth Hermele (2001). Review of Humanitarian Assistance to 
Angola through the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal: A Child Righs 
Perspective. Stockholm: Save the Children and Sida. 
Africa, Hoje (2000). Angola 25 Anos. Lisboa: África Hoje. 
Aguilar, Renato (2001). Angola 2000: Coming Out of the Woods? Stockholm: 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Country 
Economic Report 2001:8). 
Andrade, Filomena (2000). Isto é Uma Vida de Improvisos... Estudo sobre 
Deslocados em Malanje e Benguela. Luanda, Angola: Editora Humbi-
Humbi. 
Antunes, António Lobo (2000). Portugals Ære og Makt. Oslo: Pax. 
ASDI (2000). Uma Igualdade entre Mulheres e Homens em Angola. Um Perfil das 
Relacões de Género. Luanda: Agencia Sueca de Cooperacão International 
para o Desenvolvimento. 
BAF (2002). Western Foreign Policy Towards Angola in the New Millennium. 
London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, British Angola Forum. 
Billon, Philippe le (2001). “Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and 
Diamonds, 1975-2000.” In: African Affairs Vol. 100(398) pp.55-80. 
Birkeland, Nina (2000). War, Environment and Forced Migration in Angola. 
Recovery and Development after Conflict and Disaster, Trondheim, Norway: 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology. 
Birkeland, Nina M. (2000). Forced Displacement in Huambo, Angola. Causes and 
the "Deslocado" Identity. Paper to doctoral research course. Trondheim, 
Norway: Norwegian University of Technology and Science. Department of 
Geography. 
Birmingham, David (2001). "Angola". In: P. Chabal (ed.) A History of Postcolonial 
Lusophone Africa. London: Hurst and Company, pp.137-184. 
Bridge, Group (2002). Diagnostic Study on Private Sector Development in Angola. 
Windhoek: The Bridge Group. 
Castello, Benjamin A. (2000). A Força e o Papel da Sociedade Civil Angolana em 
Busca da Paz em Angola. Luanda: Church Action Angola. 
Cilliers, Jakkie and Christian Dietrich (eds.) (2000). Angola's War Economy. The 
Role of Oil and Diamonds. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security 
Studies. 
Coppé, Margrit and Fergus Power (eds.) (2002). Stories for Trees. Stories and 
Images of Angola. Luanda: Development Workshop. 
de Carvalho, Paulo (2002). Angola, Quanto Tempo Falta Para Amanhã? Oeiras: 
Celta Editora. 
de la Rocha, Mercedes Gonzales (2001). "Angola: Choices for the Poor. Lessons 
from National Poverty Strategies". In: A. Grinsbun (ed.) Choices for the 
Poor. Lessons from National Poverty Strategies. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, pp.205-217. 
ECON/FNI (2000). Petro-states: Predatory or Developmental ? Econ-Report 
62/2000. Oslo: Centre for Economic Analysis and The Fritjof Nansen 
Institute. 
EIU (2003). Angola. Country Profile 2000. London: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
EIU (2003). Country Report Angola. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
C M I 
 74 
GOA (2003). Evaluation of Angolan Petroleum Sector. Luanda: Minsistry of 
Finance / KPMG. 
Grobbelaar, Neuma, Greg Mills and Elisabeth Sidiropoulos (2003). Angola. 
Prospects for Peace and Prosperity. Johannesburg: South African Institute 
of International Affairs. 
Guedes, Armando Marques (2003). Pluralismo e Legitimação. A Edificacão 
Jurídica Pós-Colonial de Angola. Coimbra: Almedina. 
GW (2002). All the Presidents' Men. London: Global Witness. 
Hansen, Art and David Tavares (2000). "Why Angolan Soldiers Worry about 
Demobilisation and Reintegration". In: R. Black and K. Koser (eds.) The End 
of the Refugee Cycle? New York: Berghahn Books, pp.198-210. 
Heywwod, Linda (2000). Contested Power in Angola 1840s to the Present. 
Rochester: University of Rochester Press. 
Hodges, Tony (2003). Angola Anatomy of an Oil State. Oxford: James Curry. 
Howen, Nicholas (2001). Peace-Building and Civil Society in Angola. London: 
Department for International Development. 
ICG (2003). Angola's Choice: Reform or Regress. Africa report No. 61. 
Luanda/Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2003). Dealing with Savimbi's Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian 
Challenges in Angola. Africa report No. 58. Luanda / Brussels: International 
Crisis Group. 
IMF (2003). Angola. Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix IMF Country Report 
No. 03/292. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2003). Angola – Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation. Luanda: 
International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2003). Angola – Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. Luanda: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Jenskins, paul, Paul Robson and Allan Cain (2002). “Local Responses to 
Globalisation and Peripherisation in Luanda, Angola.” In: Environment & 
Urbanization Vol. 14(1) pp.1-13. 
Johannessen, Eva (2000). Evaluation of Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) in 
Angola. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. 
Kamete, Amin Y., Arne Tostensen and Inge Tvedten (2001). From Global Village to 
Urban Globe. Urbanisation and Poverty in Africa: Implications for 
Norwegian Aid Policy. CMI Report (forthcoming). Bergen: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute. 
Leite, Moema (2001). Identity Management and Self-Representation among Young 
Mulattos in Luanda, Angola. Department and Museum of Anthropology. 
Oslo: University of Oslo. 
MAPESS (2000). Estudo sobre a Macro-Estrutura da Administracão Pública 
Angolana. Uma Abordagem Preliminar. Luanda: Republica de Angola, 
Ministério da Administracão Pública, Emprego a Siguranca Social. 
Marcus, Powe (ed.) (2001). Patrimonial and Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Pace, 
Geopolitics and the Economics of War in Angola. Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 90, Vol. 28, December 2001. Hants, UK: Carfax 
Publishing Company. 
MFA (2003). Strategisk rammeverk: Angola 2003-2005. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
MSF (2000). Angola. Behind the Facade of "Normalisation". Manipulation, 
Violence and Abandoned Populations. Luanda: Médicins Sans Frontiéres 
(MSF). 
C M I 
 75 
Nordås, Hildegunn Kyvik, Inge Tvedten and Arne Wiig (2000). Impacto do 
Investimento Petrolífero Norueguês nos Países de Acolhamento, com 
especial ênfase para Angola. CMI Report R 2000:4. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute. 
Ostheimer, Anrea E. (2000). "Aid Agencies: Providers of Essential Resources?" In: 
J. Cilliers and C. Dietrich (eds.) Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and 
Diamonds. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
Richardson, Anna (2001). Children Living with UNITA. Luanda: UNICEF. 
Richardson, Anne (2000). Negotiating Humanitarian Access in Angola: 1990-2000. 
New Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
RoA (2003). Quadro Legal para o Reassentamento e Regresso das Populações 
Directamente Afectadas Pelo Conflito. Luanda: Republica de Angola, 
Ministério da Assistencia e Reinsercão Social. 
Robson, Paul (2001). "Communities and Community Institutions in Luanda, 
Angola". In: A. Tostensen, Tvedten, I. and Vaa, M. (ed.) Associational Life 
in African Cities: Popular Responses to the Urban Crisis. Uppsala: Nordic 
Africa Institute. 
Robson, Paul (ed.) (2001). Communities and Reconstruction in Angola. Guelph, 
Canada: Development Workshop. 
Robson, Paul and Sandra Roque (2001). Here in the City There is Nothing Left Over 
for a helping Hand. Luanda: Development Workshop. 
SIDA (2000). Halvårsrapport Angola April-Oktober 2000. Stockholm: Swedish 
International Development Agency. 
Southscan (2002). “Angola: Tentative hopes grow for renewal of peace process as 
UN prepares to talk to Unita.” In: Southscan. A Bulletin of Southern African 
Affairs Vol. 17(01) pp.1-5. 
Søreide, Tina (2002). Corruption in Public Procurement: Causes, Consequences 
and Cures. CMI Report 2002:1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Tali, Jean-Michel Mabeko (2001). Dissidências e Poder de Estado. O MPLA 
Perante si Próprio (Vol.I-II). Luanda: Editorial Nzila. 
Tvedten, Inge (2001). Angola 2000/2001. Key Development Issues and the Role of 
NGOs R 2001:1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Tvedten, Inge (2002). Angola 2001/2002. Key Development Issues and Aid in a 
Context of Peace R 2002:8. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (with 
contributions by Mário Adauta, Allan Cain, Tony Hiodges, Steve Kibble and 
Fernando Pacheco). 
Tvedten, Inge (2002). “La scène angolaise: limites et potential des ONG.” In: 
Lusotopie(9). 
Tvedten, Inge and with Hildegunn Nordaas (2000). Angola 1999 / 2000. Key 
Development Issues and National Research Capacity. CMI Report R 2000:2. 
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
UN (2000). Final Report  of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angolan Sanctions. 
Document S/2000/1225. New York: United Nations Security Council. 
UN (2000). Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Office in Angola. 
New York: United Nations Security Council. 
UN (2002). Angaola: The Post-War Challenges. Common Country Assessment 
2002. Luanda: United Nations System in Angola. 
UN (2004). United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2004 - Angola. 
Luanda: United Nations. 
C M I 
 76 
UNDP (2000). Angola. Economic Developments in 1999. Luanda: United Nations 
Development Programme. 
UNDP (2002). A Descentralizacão de Angola. Luanda: United Nations 
Development Programme. 
UNDP (2003). Human Development Report. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme. 
UNDP (2003). Estudo Sobre a Macro-Estrutura da Administracão Local. Luanda: 
United nations Development Programme. 
UNDP , IOM , UNICEF , WHO (2002). Public Financing of the Social Sectors in 
Angola. Luanda: UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, WHO. 
UNICEF (2000). State of the World's Children. New York: United Nations 
Children's Fund. 
UNICEF (2001). Annual Report 2000. Luanda: United Nations Children's Fund. 
Upstream (2001). Angola. The International Oil and Gas Newspaper Upstream. 
Oslo. 
Van-Dunem, José Octávio Serra (2003). Fundos Sociais: Um colírio no combate à 
pobreza? Um estudo de caso do Fundo de Apoio Social no Município de 
Viana - Angola. Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro. Rio 
de Janeiro: Rio de Janeiro. 
Various (ed.) (2000). Etnográfica. Revista do Centro de Estudos de Antropologia 
Social. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos de Antropologia Social. 
Various (ed.) (2001). Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia. Porto: Sociedade 
Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia. 
Venâncio, José Carlos (2000). A Facto Africano. Elementos ara Uma Sociología de 
África. Vega: Vega Universidade. 
WB (2003). Transitional Support Strategy for the Republic of Angola. Report No. 
25471-Ang. Washington DC: World bank. 
Wiig, Arne (2001). Supply Chain Management in the Oil Industry: The Angolan 
Case WP 2001:6. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Wille, Janecke (2000). Social Capital and Humanitarian Mine Action. Demining as 
Post-Conflict Assistance in Cassua, Angola. Department of Sociology and 
Human Geography. Oslo: University of Oslo. pp. 126. 
World, Vision (2000). Angola. The Facts. Web Page: http://worldvision.org. 
C M I 
 77 
TERMS OF REFERENCE  
OF  
ANGOLA STUDY  
BY CHRISTIAN MICHELSENS INSTITUTE (CMI) 
 
 
 
Terms of reference (TOR) for yearly country report on Angola by CMI.  
 
 
1. Background. 
This is the fourth report on Angola under the Country Advisor Agreement between the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Chr. Michelsen Institute 
(CMI). In line with the original Contract and Terms of Reference (signed 24.03/22.04.1999)  
"NORAD  acknowledge the need  for assistance from external resources in the form of 
reviews of economic, social, political and cultural conditions in selected countries of principal 
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The report should consists of a Part I synthesising and assessing recent information regarding 
political, economic and social developments in Angola, and a Part II focussing on topics of 
relevance for Norwegian development aid to be specified by NORAD.  
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Part I: Political and Economic Developments in Angola 
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2. Economic Conditions (incl. PRSP)  
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4. Development Aid 
 
Part II: Decentralization and Development in Angola 
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3. The system of local administration (political structure, the formal set-up, main 
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5. Conclusions (decentralization and development. How can Norwegian development 
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delivery?) 
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